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LEGITIMACY AND COOPERATION:
WILL IMMIGRANTS COOPERATE WITH LOCAL POLICE
WHO ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW?
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles*
Solving crimes often requires community cooperation. Cooperation is thought by many
scholars to depend critically on whether community members believe that law
enforcement institutions are legitimate and trustworthy. Yet establishing an empirical link
between legitimacy and cooperation has proven elusive, with most studies relying on
surveys or lab experiments of people’s beliefs and attitudes, rather than on their behavior
in the real world. This Article aims to overcome these shortcomings, capitalizing on a
unique natural policy experiment to directly address a fundamental question about
legitimacy, cooperation, and law enforcement success: do de-legitimating policy
interventions actually undermine community cooperation with the police? The policy
experiment is a massive federal immigration enforcement program called Secure
Communities. Secure Communities was widely criticized for undermining the legitimacy of
local police in the eyes of immigrants, and it was rolled out nationwide over a four-year
period in a way that approximates a natural experiment. Using the rate at which police
solve crimes as a proxy for community cooperation, we find no evidence that the program
reduced community cooperation—despite its massive size and broad scope. The results
call into question optimistic claims that discrete policy interventions can, in the short run,
meaningfully affect community perceptions of law enforcement legitimacy in ways that
shape community cooperation with police.
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation has long been a lynchpin of law enforcement success. Without the
assistance of community members, the criminal justice system frequently fails to
punish and prevent crimes. 1 Given cooperation’s importance in securing public
safety, it is critical to understand why (and when) community members choose to
talk to the police, testify at trial, and otherwise help public officials combat crime.
Two leading theories seek to explain community cooperation with law
enforcement. The first, developed by Wesley Skogan and others, is built on rational
choice theory.2 According to this view, individuals help the police when the material
and psychic benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. A rival account, much discussed
today, is the theory of procedural justice. Developed most prominently by Tom
Tyler, this theory posits that a person’s felt obligation to cooperate with police
depends largely on her judgment about how police treat her and, ultimately, on her
belief that the police are a legitimate institution. 3 On this account, legitimacy
becomes crucial to law enforcement success, because legitimate institutions more
effectively secure the cooperation of community members.
Procedural justice theory dominates contemporary policy debates. Myriad law
enforcement policies and practices—from stop-and-frisk tactics, to zero-tolerance
policing, to drug courts, to the treatment of mentally ill offenders, to plea bargaining,
to judicial performance, to sentencing—have all been attacked or defended by
scholars, policymakers, and advocates on procedural justice grounds.4 But for all the
theorizing, there is remarkably little evidence about the extent to which legitimacy
shapes community cooperation with law enforcement. Nearly all existing efforts to
test the theory suffer from two shortcomings. First, they typically measure public
beliefs but tell us little about actual behavior. Second, they often are not well-designed
to identify causal effects: they observe large differences in expressed beliefs about
police legitimacy, but are unable to determine whether these beliefs can be
meaningfully influenced by discrete policy interventions.
This Article aims to overcome these shortcomings, capitalizing on a unique
natural policy experiment to directly address a fundamental question about
1

See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (1971); infra Part I.

See Wesley G. Skogan, Citizen Reporting of Crime: Some National Panel Data, 13 CRIMINOLOGY 535
(1976); infra text accompanying notes []-[].
2

3

See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); infra text accompanying notes []-[].

See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal
Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285 (2014); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407 (2008); Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner, & Veronica E. Bath,
Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better Respond to
Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147 (2012); Michael M. O’Hear, Rethinking
Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463 (2009); Adam
Lamparello, Incorporating the Procedural Justice Model into Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence in the Aftermath of
United States v. Booker: Establishing United States Sentencing Courts, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 112
(2009).
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legitimacy, cooperation, and law enforcement success: do de-legitimating policy
interventions actually undermine community cooperation with the police? The policy
experiment, known as “Secure Communities,” had the ambitious goal of ensuring
that every single person arrested for a crime by local police anywhere in the country
would be screened by the federal government for immigration violations. 5
Immigration screening upon local arrest, virtually unheard of prior to the program’s
launch in 2008, was universal in the United States by the end of 2012. The program
led to the largest-ever integration of local law enforcement agencies into the process
of enforcing federal immigration law.
Secure Communities has been widely attacked on procedural justice grounds.
Immigrants’ rights activists and prominent law enforcement officials have both
argued that the program threatens to undermine the legitimacy of local law
enforcement officials in the eyes of the immigrant community. By entangling local
law enforcement in federal immigration enforcement, critics worry, the program will
erode immigrant trust in the police and lead immigrants to view the police as less
legitimate. The loss of trust and legitimacy will make immigrants shy away from
cooperating with law enforcement officials trying to solve crimes.
Recently (though after our study period), these concerns have sparked an
explosion of local policies designed to bolster the legitimacy of local police in the
eyes of immigrants. To date, well over a hundred cities and counties have adopted
policies resisting Secure Communities. These “sanctuary city” policies cannot
prevent the now-universal fingerprint-screening system at the heart of Secure
Communities. That component is mandatory. Instead, New York, San Francisco,
and other sanctuary cities have refused to honor requests from the federal
government, known as detainers, that ask the local government to hold an immigrant
for forty-eight hours so that federal agents can take custody of the immigrant.6 These
anti-detainer ordinances are necessary, these cities have argued, because local law
enforcement must disassociate itself with the federal immigration enforcement
bureaucracy in order to secure the trust and cooperation of immigrants who
otherwise would see local police as illegitimate.
The widespread view that Secure Communities corrodes trust and perceived
legitimacy makes it an ideal vehicle for testing empirically the leading theory of
cooperation’s foundation. Procedural justice theory predicts that a program like
Secure Communities—one widely thought to undermine the legitimacy of local
police—should reduce levels of cooperation by immigrants. Levels of cooperation
are nearly impossible to observe directly—at least in any large-scale way—but
5

See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 CHI. L. REV. 87 (2012).

San Francisco’s policy has recently been in the national spotlight as the result of a local murder
committed by a noncitizen whom the Sheriff’s Office had released rather than handing over to the
federal government. See Editorial Board, Lost in the Immigration Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2015.
Sergio Garcia, Sanctuary Laws Build Trust and Protect Working People, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/09/should-immigrant-sanctuary-laws-berepealed/sanctuary-laws-protect-working-people-and-build-trust.
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fortunately we have a powerful proxy available to us. If community cooperation is
crucial for law enforcement success, then less cooperation will make it harder for the
police to prevent and punish crimes. Thus, our key prediction is that any impact
Secure Communities has on community cooperation should be detectable in
“clearance rates,” the rates at which the police solve crimes.7
Two unique features of Secure Communities makes it doubly attractive for our
inquiry. First, the program did not directly affect local police tactics or resources.
This gives us greater confidence that any observed effects are due to changes in
perceptions of police legitimacy rather than due to alterations in police tactics or
effort.
Second, and perhaps more important, Secure Communities approximates a
natural experiment. The program’s ambitious scope prevented the federal
government from activating it everywhere at once. Instead, Secure Communities was
rolled out around the country over a period of four years, from 2008 to 2012. The
staggered activation makes it possible to separate causation from correlation, a
foundational problem that has plagued procedural justice literature for years. In fact,
so far as we are aware, this Article represents the first-ever use of a natural policy
experiment to test procedural justice theory’s core predictions.
We find no empirical evidence that activating Secure Communities in a
community impairs the ability of the police to solve crimes. We first estimate the
effect of the program on the rate at which local police solve FBI index crimes—
seven serious crimes that include murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, arson,
burglary, and larceny. Our results are so precisely estimated that we should detect
even relatively small declines in a county’s clearance rate for FBI index offenses, yet
the estimates show no evidence of any decline in clearance rates. Nor do the crime
rates themselves appear affected by activation. Moreover, these findings remain
unchanged if we shift from a simple binary measure of program activation to a direct
measure of the program’s intensity in each community.
It is possible, of course, that the program’s effects are isolated in particular
counties. Counties with large foreign-born and Hispanic populations are likely to
contain proportionately more immigrants, and these locations are where the program
is most likely to have the largest effect. But even when the analysis focuses on these
locations relative to others, no effect is found.
When the crimes that make up the FBI index are considered individually, the
results remain largely unchanged. A few crimes, like murder and aggravated assault,
actually have slightly higher clearance rates after Secure Communities than before.
Motor vehicle theft is the only of the seven FBI index offenses to show a statistically
significant drop in clearance rate, but the magnitude of this change is less than one
percent—smaller even than the tiny increases seen for murder and aggravated
assault, and dwarfed by the generally high levels of volatility in clearance rates across
7 As we explain more fully below, we also look for any evidence that the program reduces the
rate of at which community members report crimes.
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communities. On the whole, the estimates suggest that Secure Communities, a
program frequently alleged to erode trust in the police, did not affect the rate at
which police cleared crimes.
These striking finding might be interpreted in two ways. One possibility is that
perceptions of legitimacy do not powerfully affect people’s level of cooperation with
the police. Perhaps people decide whether to cooperate for reasons—such as selfinterest, or a sense of personal morality—that have little to do with whether they
trust the police or perceive the police as legitimate. This conclusion would have
profound implications for a number of debates about policing in diverse societies
and about the role of procedural justice in securing cooperation with law
enforcement.
The other possibility, of course, is that the oft-asserted claims about Secure
Communities’ de-legitimating effects were incorrect. Perhaps integrating local police
into federal immigration enforcement did not meaningfully undermine immigrant
communities’ trust and confidence in the local law enforcement. This conclusion
would cast doubt on the legitimacy-based arguments against cooperative immigration
federalism and in favor of sanctuary city policies.8 More importantly, it would be a
serious blow to the practical relevance of procedural justice theory for public policy.
It would call into question the theory’s optimism about the ability of discrete policy
interventions to significantly change public attitudes about the police. Over the long
run, of course, one hopes that well-designed public policies can promote the
legitimacy of law enforcement institutions and the cooperation engendered by that
legitimacy. But public beliefs about the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the police
may be far too sticky for an individual law enforcement program, even one as
massive as Secure Communities, to significantly alter those beliefs over the short run.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I unpacks the dominant theories of
why people cooperate with the police. Part II explains the how the unique policy
experiment of Secure Communities permits us to get empirical purchase on the
theoretical claim that trust-eroding policing policies will undercut community
cooperation with the police. Part III discusses our results and their implications—
both for debates about the connection between procedural justice and cooperation,
as well as for current controversies over cooperative immigration federalism.

Together with other work we have done, this would suggest that both sides in the debate over
Secure Communities were wrong. Supporters of the program have been wrong to claim that it was a
critical crime control policy. For, as we have shown, Secure Communities had no effect on crime
rates. See Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from
Secure Communities, 79 J.L. ECON. (2014).; see also Kirk Semple, Deportations Have ‘No Observable Effect’ on
Crime Rate, Study Concludes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2014 (discussing the findings of our study of Secure
Communities’ effect on crime). But on this interpretation of our clearance rate finding, critics of the
program would also have been wrong to claim that the program undermines law enforcement by
destroying immigrant trust in the police.
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I. POLICE LEGITIMACY AND COMMUNITY COOPERATION
The social production of community safety is crucial to understanding crime.
Much crime control is due to voluntary compliance and informal social sanctions for
law breaking.9 Even when one focuses in on public enforcement as a strategy for
preventing and punishing crimes, community involvement remains important.
Community members report crimes to the police, assist investigations by providing
tips and eyewitness accounts, testify at criminal trials, and cooperate in myriad other
ways.10 Because this sort of cooperation is widely seen as crucial to law enforcement
success, persuading community members to undertake these activities has long been
a central goal of law enforcement agencies.
The community policing revolution, which began in the 1960s and 1970s, is
perhaps the most salient historical example of these efforts to build policecommunity relations and promote cooperation with the police.11 But the antecedents
to this movement can be traced back much earlier in the twentieth century, to
reforms begun in the progressive era to professionalize police forces.12 And today the
movement’s progeny are everywhere, in discussions about order-maintenance
policing, community-based prosecution, and countless other law enforcement
initiatives.13 This history raises two crucial questions, one theoretical and the other
empirical. First, what theories explain why individuals cooperate with the police and
how this cooperation is affected by law enforcement policies? Second, how do we
test these theories of cooperation in a world where the behavior at issue—
cooperation—is extremely difficult to measure directly in the real world?
A.  Mechanisms of Cooperation
An enormous literature investigates why people cooperate with the police. The
theories around which this literature is organized can be lumped into two broad
categories. The first focuses on instrumental mechanisms; the second emphasizes
mechanisms that turn on the legitimacy of legal institutions.
1.   Instrumental Mechanisms
Early research on community-police relations focused on a fundamental form of
cooperation: the individual victim’s decision to report the incident to the police.
Wesley Skogan’s influential 1976 article drew attention to three factors influencing
See ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME (1993);
CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (1942);
Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social- Disorganization
Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774 (1989).
9

10

See REISS, supra note 1, at []-[].

11

See DAVID SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008).

12

See id. at [].

13

See sources cited infra at notes []-[].
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this decision: the characteristics of the victim, the relationship between the victim
and offender, and the gravity of the crime.14 Skogan’s framework broke sharply with
prior approaches, which characterized the failure of victims to report crime as a
“social pathology” and “individual failure.” In place of this moralizing, Skogan
proposed a framework of rational decisionmaking in which “[p]eople report or not
for good reason.” 15 Much of the subsequent research on crime reporting has
continued to operate either explicitly or implicitly within this rational choice
framework.
The potential benefits of reporting range from the self-interested to the
altruistic. For property crimes, reporting may be a first step in securing return of
stolen property, and insurers may require it before indemnifying a loss. For all
crimes, reporting the offense may be a pre-condition to obtaining compensation
from offenders for the harm imposed. Where compensation is not possible—
perhaps because the offender lacks resources—a victim may report in order to help
the police catch and convict the offender. Conviction and punishment may offer the
victim the emotional satisfaction or psychological consolation that the wrong has
been corrected and justice meted out to the wrongdoer. Punishment may also serve
the victim’s altruistic desire to prevent the offender from inflicting similar harms on
others in the community. All of these benefits may increase with the seriousness of
the offense, and empirical studies have consistently found that more serious offenses
are reported at higher rates.16
Yet crime victims can obtain these benefits only if they are also willing to bear
the costs of reporting crimes. In many cases these costs may be relatively minor—
such as the hassle of traveling to a police station, explaining the incident to an
officer, and filing out the paperwork. But even these “minor” costs can disrupt work
and family obligations, especially if repeated interviews with police and multiple
court appearances are necessary. And for some crimes, particularly sex offenses, the
act of reporting to the police and testifying can be substantial burdens. It can cause
embarrassment, shame, and emotional harm for the victim—harms some victims’
rights advocates describe as a second victimization.17 The victim’s dignity may also
suffer if the police fail to respect the victim.18 Worse, these burdens may come with
14 See Wesley G. Skogan, Citizen Reporting of Crime: Some National Panel Data, 13 CRIMINOLOGY
535 (1976) [hereinafter Skogan, Citizen Reporting of Crime].
15

Id. at 536.

See Skogan, Citizen Reporting of Crime, supra note [], at 544-47; Michael R. Gottfredson &
Michael J. Hindelang, A Study of the Behavior of Law, 44 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 3 (1979).
16

17 Alan J. Lizotte, The Uniqueness of Rape: Reporting Assaultive Violence to the Police, 31 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 169 (1985).
18 Fisher at al. found that college women who were victims of sexual assault were more likely to
report the offense to the police when its nature made the victim more credible such as the presence of
a weapon, the offender was a stranger, and the victim had not consumed alcohol. Bonnie S. Fisher et
al. Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Others: Results from a National-Level Study of College Women,
30 CRIMINAL JUSTICE & BEHAVIOR 6, 27-30 (2003).
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no offsetting benefits if the police are unable to locate and convict the offender.19
This may induce victims to report only when they possess information likely to help
police apprehend the offender. The failure of police to arrest and convict the
wrongdoer might, in turn, further aggravate and emotionally harm the victim.
Victims may also worry about retaliation. Social networks, or the police
investigation itself, may inform the offender that the victim has reported the offense
and perhaps incriminated the offender specifically. The fear of violent reprisal from
the offender or his confederates may further discourage reporting.20 Finally, victims
may fail to report a crime because the context of the offense may reveal to the police
the victim’s own law-breaking.21 A standard example is that a drug dealer may fail to
report a theft of his drug inventory or its cash proceeds. Immigrants without legal
status may also be reluctant to report crimes because identifying themselves to police
may expose them or their companions to immigration enforcement actions and
ultimately deportation.22
2.   Legitimacy and Procedural Justice
A competing theory of cooperation is that people cooperate with legal
authorities because they feel obligated to do so—not simply because doing so serves
their own interests. This sense of obligation arises when people perceive legal
authorities to be legitimate. On this psychological account, therefore, people’s beliefs

19 Police may not “solve” a crime when they fail to exert effort or when information necessary
for apprehension and conviction is not available. See Skogan, Citizen Reporting of Crime, supra note [], at
548-49; Wesley G. Skogan & George E. Antunes, Information, Apprehension, and Deterrence: Exploring the
Limits of Police Productivity, 7 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 217 (1979) (arguing that if police rely on the information
readily available to them rather than acquiring information from witnesses and surveillance,
apprehension rates will not rise).
20 Simon I. Singer, The Fear of Reprisal and the Failure of Victims to Report a Personal Crime, 4 J.
QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1988).

Mark T. Berg et al., Illegal Behavior, Neighborhood Context, and Police Reporting by Victims of Violence,
50 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 75, 87-92 (2013) (finding in a survey of youth that selfreported involvement in criminality reduces the willingness to report being a victim of robbery or
assault).
21

22 Elizabeth Fussell, The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino Migrants: Wage Theft
and Robbery, 52 SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 593 (2011) (presenting survey evidence that that Latinos
working construction jobs in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina were more likely to be victims of
wage theft because employers believed the risk of deportation dissuaded their reporting it); Dane
Hautala et al., Predictors of Police Reporting among Hispanic Immigrant Victims of Violence, RACE & JUSTICE
(forthcoming 2015) (reporting a 32% reporting rate in this sample and that it rises with the
seriousness of the offense). But see Callie Marie Rennison, Reporting to the Police by Hispanic Victims of
Violence, 22 VICTIMS & VIOLENCE 754, 759 & 761-63 (2007) (finding modest differences in rates at
which Hispanics report assaults relative to non-Hispanics, but the data do not include measures of
immigrant status); see also infra text accompanying notes []-[].
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and attitudes about the legitimacy of a legal institution—not just their narrow selfinterest—affects the extent of their cooperation with that institution.23
What shapes public beliefs about whether the police are legitimate? There are
any number of possibilities, but today the dominant explanation is supplied by
procedural justice theory. Developed by Tom Tyler, the theory is a legitimacy-based
account of why people obey the law and cooperate with the police. 24 As Tyler
himself has described the theory:
The procedural justice model involves two stages. The first involves the
argument that public behavior is rooted in evaluations of the legitimacy of the
police and courts. People’s social values—in this case, their feelings of
obligation and responsibility to obey legitimate authorities—are viewed as key
antecedents of public behavior. In other words, people cooperate with the
police and courts in their everyday lives when they view those authorities as
legitimate and entitled to be obeyed.
The second involves the antecedents of legitimacy. The procedural justice
argument is that process-based assessments are the key antecedent of legitimacy
(Tyler 1990). In this analysis, four indicators—summary judgments of
procedural justice, inferences of motive-based trust, judgments about the
fairness of decision making, and judgments about the fairness of interpersonal
treatment—are treated as indices of an overall assessment of procedural justice
in the exercise of authority.25
Procedural justice theory’s key innovation, therefore, is to provide a
psychological explanation of what drives people’s beliefs about legitimacy, as well as
a prediction about how these beliefs shape legal compliance and cooperation. The
claim is that people’s beliefs are shaped mostly by criminal justice procedures—by
the way in which law enforcement officials behave—rather than by criminal justice
outcomes. 26 If police procedures are viewed by the public as just, community
members will be more likely to see the police as legitimate. Procedures viewed as
unjust will have de-legitimating effects.
It is helpful to notice that these competing psychological accounts of legal compliance and
cooperation—one grounded in rational choice, the other in legitimacy and obligation—parallel the
dominant competing accounts of the very nature of law within legal philosophy. One account of the
nature of law, developed most prominently by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, argues that law is
nothing more than commands backed by sanctions. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES AND MORALS OF LEGISLATION (1823). The competing account, developed by
H.L.A. Hart, argues that the nature of law lies in the internalization of an obligation to obey legal
rules. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For a recent effort to connect these analytic
debates about the “nature” of law to psychological debates about why people comply with the law, see
FRED SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015).
23

See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS
(2013)TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
24

25

Tom Tyler (2006).

26

See TYLER, supra note [], at [].
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This raises, of course, the question of which sorts of procedures are likely to be
viewed by the public as procedurally just. The enormous procedural justice literature
that has developed over the last two decades provides literally hundreds of
possibilities. From a theoretical perspective, however, proponents of the theory
typically argue that a person’s procedural justice assessments are driven primarily by
whether the person feels that the legal authority (1) uses fair procedures, (2) treats
her fairly, and (3) acts in a way that shows that the authority is concerned about her
and will behave in ways that serve her interests.27 So fair procedures, fair treatment,
and the trustworthiness of police motives are key determinants of the public’s
procedural justice judgments.28
While procedural justice theory was first deployed to explain compliance with
the law, Tyler and others have argued that it is even more important for explaining
cooperation: “cooperation is a more fragile commodity than compliance, because it
is easy for people not to cooperate.”29 For this reason, they argue that the theory can
explain myriad types of community cooperation with the police—and do so better
than alternative theories grounded in incentives and self-interest.30 Under the theory,
attitudes translate into actions in the following fashion:
Procedural justice theorists take the position that that these attitudes can, but need not be,
based on a person’s personal interactions with the police. While one strand of procedural justice
scholarship considers on people’s personal interactions with the police, another strand considers the
general public’s overall evaluation of police rather than personal experiences with legal authorities. See
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUSTICE 283, 317-18
(2003); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group
Members Want from Legal Authorities?, 19 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 215 (2001). Procedural justice research
on immigrants in particular often focuses on beliefs that are not connected directly to personal
interactions with the police. See David S. Kirk, Andrew Papachristos, Jeffrey Fagan, & Tom Tyler, The
Paradox of Law Enforcement in Immigrant Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public
Safety?, 641 ANNALS, AAPSS 79 (2012)
27

See David DeCremer & Tom R. Tyler, The Effects of Trust in Authority and Procedural Fairness in
Cooperation, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 639, 641 (2007). Trust can be decomposed into two types: (1)
institutional, which refers to the perception that police are honest institutional players who care for
members of the communities they police; and (2) motivation-based, which is the belief that police
officers have good intentions when they interact with the public and will make a good faith effort to
respond to their needs. See Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and
Confidence in the Police, 8 POLICE QUARTERLY 322, 325-26 (2005).
28

29 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler, & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing as a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 348
(2011).

See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police
Fight Crime in their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 238-40, 252-55 (2008); Schulhofer et al,
supra note []. For example, Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler measure cooperation with the police by
creating an index from responses on a 6-point scale to the following ten questions: would you call
police to report a crime occurring in your neighborhood; to report an accident; to help police find
someone suspected of committing a crime; give info to police to help solve a crime; report dangerous
or suspicious activities; voluntarily work as a liaison officer at night/weekends; show police around
your neighborhood; volunteer to attend community meeting to discuss crime in neighborhood; work
with neighborhood watch; serve on neighborhood committee. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The
30
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Procedural justice theory contrasts sharply with other theories of legal
compliance and cooperation. Deterrence theory, which Gary Becker most
prominently articulated, predicts that compliance with the law is determined by the
anticipated gain from offending relative to the size of the expected punishment for
violations, which is a product of the probability of apprehension and magnitude of
the sanction.31 Procedural justice theory discounts the role sanctions play in securing
legal compliance. It also downplays the importance of visible police efficacy.
Others—most prominently George Kelling and James Q. Wilson in their “broken
windows” theory of crime—have contended that demonstrations of police
effectiveness in controlling crime are crucial to securing compliance, because small
disorders left unchecked escalate into crimes that are greater in number and more
serious in nature.32 But these ideas are rejected by procedural justice theory. Finally,
the theory deemphasizes the relevance of the distributive fairness of law
enforcement. Whether police services are fairly distributed across communities has
little effect, from a procedural justice perspective, on levels of legal compliance and
community cooperation.33
The theory’s distinctive conception of human motivations also leads to different
recommendations for policing strategy. Tyler advocates “process-based regulation”
in which “police can best regulate public behavior by focusing on engaging the social
values, such as legitimacy, that lead to self-regulation on the part of most of the
public, most of the time.” 34 Practices and policies characterized by procedural
legitimacy will build police legitimacy, and when police must exercise their discretion,
Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513,
541-42 (2003).
31 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 174-76
(1968). See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note [], at 514 (describing credible threats for rule-breakers as a
“risk” approach). In this way, the difference between the procedural justice and instrumental accounts
tracks loosely a longstanding divide about why people comply with the law (as well as a very old
disagreement in legal theory about the concept of law). Thus, we might say that Tyler’s procedural
justice framework is more Hartian than Holmesian.
32 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 249
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29 (1982). See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note [], at 514 (describing a police
“performance” approach).
33

See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note [], at 514.

See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note [], at 515, 535; see also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HOU, TRUST
IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH POLICE AND COURTS 198-208 (2002).
34
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the public will be more likely to support the decision.35 Ultimately, police policies
that the public perceives as procedurally legitimate will be those which are most
effective in fighting crime.
B.   Existing Empirical Evidence
Procedural justice theory purports to explain why people cooperate with the
police. How can the theory be tested empirically? As it turns out, demonstrating that
legitimacy-altering policies actually affect the extent of community cooperation with
the police has proven to be an incredibly difficult task.
Existing empirical efforts suffer from two important limitations. First, the
procedural justice literature does not seek to measure actual cooperation with the
police. Instead, it has focused almost exclusively on an input in or an intermediate
step in the causal chain of the procedural justice model: the effect of perceived
legitimacy on attitudes about cooperation. Early studies relied on classroom
simulations with college students. 36 Subsequent work examined actual litigants,
members of the public, and members of heavily-policed groups.37 Most procedural
justice scholarship involves surveys that use a series of questions to tease out
attitudes about police practices, about the police themselves, and about one’s
willingness to cooperate with the police or comply with the law. The connection
between attitudes and actual cooperative behavior is presumed. 38 Thus, even if

35

See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note [], at 535.

See, e.g., Laurens Walker, Stephen LaTour, E. Allan Lind, & John Thibaut, Reactions of
Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 295, 298 (1974); Ruth
Kanfer, John Sawyer, Christopher P. Earley, E. Allan Lind, Participation in Task Evaluation Procedures:
The Effects of Influential Opinion Expression and Knowledge of Evaluative Criteria on Attitudes and Performance, 1
SOC. JUSTICE RESEARCH 235 (1987); E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer, Christopher P. Earley, Voice, Control,
and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 952, 954 (1990).
36

37 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler, & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Case, 22
LAW & SOC. REV. 483, 487-89 (1988) (felony defendants); TYLER, supra note [], at 327 (telephone
survey of New York City residents); Tyler & Fagan (a two-wave telephone survey of New York City
residents); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note [] (a two-wave telephone survey of New York City residents);
Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler, & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in
Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 728, 736-38 (2011)
(two surveys of Muslims in London); Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler, & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Why Does
the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17
PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, & LAW 419, 426 (2011) (multiple waves of Muslims and general
residents of New York City); Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, & Jeffrey Fagan, Why Do
Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders, 102 J. CRIM.
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 387, 412-16 (2012) (adults on probation or parole living in high crime Chicago
neighborhoods).

As procedural justice scholars note, the “concern with cooperation develops from the
recognition that effective crime control and disorder management depends on public cooperation
with the police.” Sunshine & Tyler, supra note [], at 535 (quoting Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls
1997).
38
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surveys accurately measure attitudes, those attitudes may not necessarily reflect actual
behavior.
Second, studies of procedural justice typically do not employ the empirical
designs commonly found in the policy evaluation literature, designs that are intended
to estimate the causal impacts of specific policy interventions. Many procedural
justice studies conduct surveys of residents within a single jurisdiction. These studies
therefore do not capture policy changes that might support credible inferences about
the impact of specific policies. Even when these studies encompass multiple
jurisdictions, numerous other unobserved differences across jurisdictions impair the
ability of these cross-sectional comparisons to support causal claims. 39 A small
number of procedural justice researchers have conducted experiments rather than
surveys. In a recent meta-analysis of nearly 1,000 empirical studies investigating
police interactions with individuals that implicated procedural justice, the authors
found that fewer than 30 studies employed the strategy of randomizing subjects into
treatment and control groups. 40 A standard limitation of experiments is that the
treatment that the researcher administers may reflect only part of the wider public
policy of interest. Although inspired by actual policies and practices, experiments can
employ only laboratory proxies for them. Another conventional uncertainty
surrounding experiments is whether any findings generalize beyond the experimental
setting. In view of these limitations, additional methods should be deployed to assess
procedural justice theory.
II. A COOPERATION EXPERIMENT IN IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
The ideal experiment testing legitimacy’s importance for community
cooperation would be a randomized policy intervention that altered public attitudes
about the police. The intervention would cause community members in some
locations, but not others, to see the police as less legitimate than they did prior to the
experiment. If residents in the communities that received the policy “treatment”
started to cooperate less with the police, but residents of the “control” communities
did not, we would have strong evidence that the de-legitimizing policy affected levels
of community cooperation in the real world.
To approach this ideal experiment and solve the problems that have plagued
existing attempts to measure legitimacy’s effects on cooperation, therefore, one
would like to have: (1) a policy that undermines the trustworthiness and legitimacy of
the police in the eyes of immigrants, (2) a mechanism to randomly apply that policy

39 Two studies that used longitudinal data are: Tyler & Fagan, supra note [], at 244-45; and Tom
R. Tyler, Lawrence Sherman, Heather Strang, Geoffrey C. Barnes, & Daniel Woods, Reintegrative
Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra
RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 L. & SOC. REV. 553, 560-63 (2007)
40 Lorraine Mazerolle, et al., Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy: A Systemic Review of the Research
Evidence, 9 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 245, 255-56 (2013).
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to some communities but not others, and (3) a measure of actual cooperative
behavior.
Our core innovation is to identify a real-world policy—Secure Communities—
that provides the first two items on this checklist. First, the information-sharing
program was widely seen as undermining the trustworthiness and legitimacy of local
police in the eyes of immigrants—particularly immigrants living in the United States
unlawfully. Importantly, it did so without simultaneously changing local police tactics
or resources in a way that might have altered levels of community cooperation
irrespective of any effect caused by the loss of trust and legitimacy.
Second, the way in which Secure Communities was activated around the country
on a county-by-county basis approximates a natural experiment. This makes it
possible to make comparisons of counties with and without the controversial
program, as well as to make comparisons before and after the program was activated
in a county. Moreover, because community cooperation was not an explicit objective
of the program, making it likely that that timing of the program’s rollout was likely
unrelated (exogenous, economists would say) to the degree of community
cooperation within each county. These features allow us to identify the program’s
causal effect on cooperation.
This leaves the challenge of measuring cooperative behavior rather than just
beliefs. Our second innovation solves this problem by focusing directly on the outputs
of the procedural justice model, rather than its inputs. We capitalize on the fact that
the ultimate output—the ability of police to solve and reduce crime as a result of
community cooperation—is in principle observable. In fact, a large literature in
criminology examines the frequency with which police “clear” crimes—that is, solve
them by arresting offenders or by other means.41 Clearance rates thus permit us to
measure how likely the police are to solve any particular category of crime. Changes
in clearance rates thus furnish a proxy for changes in cooperative behavior that result
from Secure Communities.
A.  Trust, Legitimacy and Secure Communities
1.   The Program
The American immigration enforcement system has long been characterized by
high levels of both unauthorized migration and deportation.42 In this system, locating
unauthorized immigrants is crucial to the rational functioning of the immigrant
screening system.43 But information on the identity and whereabouts of unauthorized
immigrants has proven hard for the federal government to come by.
See Marc Riedel, Homicide Arrest Clearances: A Review of the Literature, 2 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS
1145, 1153-55 (2008).
41

42 See generally Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59
STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007) (conceptualizing the immigration system as a screening system, and
emphasizing the information asymmetry at the heart of the system).
43

See id.; Cox & Miles, supra note [], at 131-35.
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Despite the importance of information in immigration enforcement, there has
historically been relatively little information-sharing between local and federal
officials about immigrant status. This is true even with respect to a long-standing
federal enforcement priority: the desire to deport immigrants who engage in crime.
For decades, when local law enforcement agencies arrested immigrants or convicted
them of crimes, federal immigration officials were only sporadically informed. Often
the local officials had no way of knowing whether an arrestee was a potentially
deportable noncitizen. And even if they happened to know the noncitizen’s status
(or the fact that a conviction might render the noncitizen deportable), the likelihood
that they would alert federal officials turned entirely on informal cooperative
relationships among local and federal law enforcement agencies.44
Beginning in the late 1980s, the federal government launched several initiatives
to change this pattern by arranging for individual inmates to be interviewed in local
jails and prisons. These interviews were conducted by federal officials pursuant to
the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), 45 and by deputized local law enforcement
officials under so called “287(g)” agreements—agreements named for the provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act that authorized them.46 These labor-intensive
efforts were piecemeal. Federal personnel conducted these screenings in less than 15
percent of local jails and prisons, and local officials were authorized to do the
screenings themselves in only about two percent of the nation’s counties.47
This all changed in 2008. Dissatisfied with the modest progress of the CAP and
287(g) programs, the Department of Homeland Security launched “Secure
Communities.” 48 The program was no less than an information revolution. It
established a system of universal and automated screening such that every single person
arrested by a local law enforcement official anywhere in the country would be screened
by the federal government for immigration status and deportation eligibility.
The program accomplished this through a technological innovation that
piggybacks on standard arrest procedures.49 Traditionally, when a person is arrested
and booked by a state or local law enforcement agency, his fingerprints are taken and
44

See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note [], at 944.

The first incarnation of CAP was the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program, launched in
1986 as a pilot project in four cities. See Mark R. Rosenblum & William A. Kandel, Interior
Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, Congressional Research Service
(December 20, 2012); Andrea Guttin, The Criminal Alien Program, American Immigration Council
(2010).
45

The name “287(g)” refers to section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC §
1357(g), the federal statute that authorizes the Attorney General to enter into these agreements.
46

47

See Cox & Miles, supra note [], at 92-93.

48 See Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) for
Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens 7 (DHS Aug
2008).
49 The account of the program draws on our description in Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox,
Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence From Secure Communities, 57 J. L. & ECON. 1 (2014).
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forwarded electronically to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which
conducts a criminal background check and sends the results to the local agency.
Secure Communities’ innovation was to take the fingerprints received by the FBI and
automatically and electronically forward them to DHS. DHS then compares the
fingerprints against its Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), a
database which stores biometric and biographical information on persons
encountered by the agency in the course of its immigration-related or other activities.
The database includes fingerprints of three categories of foreign-born persons: (1)
noncitizens present in the U.S. in violation of immigration law, such as persons who
were previously deported or overstayed their visas; (2) noncitizens who are lawfully
in the United States but who might become deportable were they to be convicted of
the crime for which they have been arrested; (3) citizens who naturalized at some
date after their fingerprints were included in the database.50
If the fingerprints matched a set in the DHS database, DHS personnel evaluated
the person’s immigration status and decide whether to place a “detainer” (sometimes
referred to as an “immigration hold”) on the person. The detainer requested that the
local law enforcement agency hold the person for forty-eight hours beyond the
scheduled release, in order to permit Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
to transfer the person to federal custody for the initiation of deportation
proceedings. 51 The detainer thus allowed the federal government to readily
apprehend and place in deportation proceedings a noncitizen whom the local
criminal justice system would otherwise release. This included a person who
otherwise would have been released because her arrest did not result in conviction,
because she was granted bail pending the outcome of her criminal proceeding, or
because she had completed her term of incarceration following conviction.
Secure Communities thus increased the likelihood that noncitizens arrested for
crimes by local authorities will be identified by the federal government, apprehended
by the immigration authorities (rather than released), and ultimately deported from
the country. The program’s ambitious scope made it the largest expansion of local
involvement in immigration enforcement in the nation’s history.
2.   De-Legitimating Local Police
Procedural justice theory predicts that involving local police in the enforcement
of federal immigration law will undermine the legitimacy of local law enforcement
institutions. This prediction, widely subscribed to by procedural justice scholars
(including Tom Tyler himself) is that the
assignment of immigration enforcement to local police . . . may have
complications that its proponents have not anticipated. One potentially
significant byproduct of such enforcement is the changing of attitudes toward
50

See id.

See Christopher Lash, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 629 (2013).
51
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the law, legal authority, and especially the police in immigrant communities. . . .
Thus a paradox arises: harsh legal sanctions against immigrants are often framed
as a means to keep communities “safe,” yet they may in fact have the opposite
effect by decreasing cooperation with police.52
On this account, the integration of local police activates several of the psychological
mechanisms described by procedural justice theory. Immigrants are more likely (1) to
see police procedures as unfair when those procedures incorporate elements of
immigration enforcement, rather than focusing exclusively on public safety; (2) to
believe that they will be treated unfairly by the police in comparison to those who do
not appear to be immigrants,53 and (3) to see local police involvement as evidence
that police are less concerned about immigrants and will not always behave in ways
that serve their interests. 54 In other words, the theory predicts that local police
involvement in immigration enforcement will affect immigrants’ procedural justice
judgments about fair procedures, about fair treatment, and about the trustworthiness
of the police.55
Secure Communities was the largest integration of local police into federal
immigration enforcement in the nation’s history. The scale of the policy intervention
was vast. According to operational data we obtained about the program through
extensive FOIA requests, Secure Communities led to the federal detention of over a
quarter of a million immigrants during its first four years of operation. As a
percentage of noncitizens in the United States, this figure is larger than the
percentage of the entire U.S. population that is currently incarcerated in the criminal
52 David S. Kirk, Andrew Papachristos, Jeffrey Fagan, & Tom Tyler, The Paradox of Law
Enforcement in Immigrant Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public Safety?, 641
ANNALS, AAPSS 79 (2012) (emphasis in original).

As procedural justice scholars have emphasized, this perception may take two forms. First,
immigrants may believe that the police treat citizens better than immigrants. Second, local
immigration enforcement may also lead immigrants to believe that police make race-based decisions
about them, also undermining immigrants’ perceptions of procedural justice: “[W]e have shown . . .
mounting evidence that this policy [of immigration enforcement by local police] would create the
perception (if not the reality) of racial (anti-Latino) bias. This perceived bias in cross-deputization
policy would taint the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the community, a grave development
given that illegitimacy has been shown consistently to undermine the relationship between the
community and the police, rendering the police less effective.” Liana Maris Epstein & Phillip Atiba
Goff, Safety or Liberty? The Bogus Trade-off of Cross-Deputization Policy, 11 ANALYSES OF SOCIAL ISSUES &
PUB. POL’Y, 314 (2011). See generally Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial
Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien Program, Warren Institute (2009).
53

See., e.g., Kirk et al., supra note []; Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Janice Iwama, The Reality of the Secure
Communities Program: Are Our Communities Really Becoming More Secure?, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC
POLICY 339 (2014); Charles E. Kubrin, Secure Or Insecure Communities?, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC
POLICY 1 (2014); David A. Harris, Immigration and National Security: The Illusion of Safety through Local
Enforcement Action, 28 ARIZ. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. [], at 390-91 (2012); Jason G. Idilbi, Local
Enforcement of Federal Immigration law: Should North Carolina Communities Implement 287(g) Authority, 86
N.C. L. Rev. 1710 (2008).
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See id.
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justice system.56 Given the size of the intervention and the theoretical prediction of
procedural justice theory, it should come as little surprise that Secure Communities
was widely seen as a serious threat to immigrant trust in the local criminal justice
system—perhaps the most serious threat in decades.57
This concern was far from limited to procedural justice scholars. Indeed, the
claim that Secure Communities would undermine immigrant cooperation with local
police became the dominant critique leveled against the program by advocates and
public officials around the country. Leading immigrants’ rights groups organizing
against Secure Communities in communities where it was being activated. 58 The
National Day Laborers Organizing Network, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and others argued that the the program would undermine relations between local
police and immigrant communities. Immigrants would no longer trust that the police
were working to serve their interests, and this distrust would make immigrants
reluctant to interact with the police.59
These organizations backed up their claims with survey evidence suggesting that
these de-legitimating effects would affect immigrant attitudes about cooperation.
One widely cited study—involving a randomized survey of over 2,000 Latinos living
in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and Phoenix—documented the way that the
increasing integration of local police into federal immigration enforcement was
shaping perceptions of the police.60 According to the survey, nearly half of foreign56 See Miles & Cox, supra note [], at []. In a way this impact is unsurprising. Some 40 million
immigrants live in the United States today—more than ten percent of the nation’s population—and
roughly 25 million of those immigrants are still noncitizens (the remainder have naturalized).
Moreover, of the 25 million noncitizens, nearly half are currently living in the country in violation of
immigration law. And because of migration patterns and residential segregation, the numbers are
often much more stark at the local level; it is easy to find neighborhoods where the majority of
residents are either unauthorized immigrants or are related to someone who is.

See, e.g., Martinez & Iwama, supra note [], at [] (deploying procedural justice theory to argue
that Secure Communities threatens to “produce mistrust of local police, create conflict with the goals
of community policing, and provoke suspicion on the part of newcomers”); Kubrin, supra note []
(same).
57

See, e.g., Kate Linthicum, Obama Ends Secure Communities Program as Part of Immigration Action,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014 (surveying the history of critiques by immigration advocates).
58

See Rachel Zoghlin, Insecure Communities: How Increased Localization of Immigration Enforcement
Under President Obama through the Secure Communities Program Makes Us Less Safe, and May Violate the
Constitution, 6 MOD. AM. 20 (2010) (collecting opposition from immigrant advocacy groups and law
enforcement officials); Alex Stepick, False Promises: The Failure of Secure Communities in MiamiDade
County,
Americans
for
Immigrant
Justice
(Apr.
2013)
(same),
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aijustice/pages/283/attachments/original/
1390429692/False-Promises-The-Failure-of-Secure-Communities-in-Miami-DadeCounty.pdf?1390429692.
59

60 See Nik Theodore, Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in
Immigration Enforcement (May 2013), http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_
COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF. For similar survey evidence, see Phillip Atiba Goff et al.,
Crossing the Line of Legitimacy: The Impact of Cross-Deputization Policy on Crime Reporting, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 250 (2013).
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born respondents reported that increased local involvement in immigration
enforcement made them less likely to report crimes or provide information to the
police—even in situations where they were themselves victims. 61 The results were
even more stark among respondents who identified themselves as undocumented: in
that group, more than two-thirds said that they would be less likely to go to the
police.62
The concern that Secure Communities undermines cooperation has also been
raised by law enforcement officials around the country. The sentiment was wellcaptured by Michael Hennessey, the sheriff of San Francisco:
Maintaining public safety requires earning community trust. We rely heavily on
the trust and cooperation of all community members—including immigrants—
to come forward and report crimes, either as victims or as witnesses. Otherwise,
crimes go unreported—and this affects everyone, citizens and noncitizens alike .
. . Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s controversial Secure Communities
program violates this hard-earned trust with immigrant residents.63
Many other prominent public officials, including New York’s famous former district
attorney Robert Morgenthau,64 as well as former Los Angeles and current New York
City police chief William Bratton, 65 have echoed this view. 66 It is shared by many
61

See Theodore, supra note [], at 5-6.

62

See id.

63 Michael Hennessey, Secure Communities Destroys Public Trust, SFGATE, May 1, 2011,
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Secure-Communities-destroys-public-trust-2373213.php.

See Robert Morganthau, Opinion: The Police and Immigration: New York’s Experience, WALL ST. J.,
May 18, 2010.
64

65 See Chief William J. Bratton, Comments on Immigration, Los Angeles Police Department
Newsroom (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.lapdonline.org/newsroom/content_basic_view/
43388.

See, e.g., Joseph A. Curtatone, Ending Secure Communities Strengthens Police, Public Cooperation,
SOMERVILLE TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, http://www.thesomervilletimes.com/archives/54592 (quoting
the mayor of Somerville, Massachusetts: “Truly keeping a community safe requires the police and
residents to work together. Secure Communities undermined the trust needed for that kind of
collaboration to happen between law enforcement and residents . . . It discouraged innocent
immigrant victims and witnesses of crimes from reporting or cooperating with law enforcement due
to fear of deportation. Police officers who rely on public cooperation to solve crimes and maintain
public safety found their jobs harder, not easier.”); Immigrants Say Chicago Sanctuary Policy Being Violated,
FOX NEWS LATINO, Aug. 9, 2011 (quoting Cook County (Chicago) Sheriff Tom Dart’s concern that
cooperation was “erod[ing] the immigrant communities’ confidence in the role of law enforcement),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/08/09/immigrants-say-chicago-sanctuary-policybeing-violated/. See generally Chris Burbank, Phillip Atiba Goff & Dr. Tracie L. Keesee, Policing
Immigration: A Job We Do Not Want, HUFFINGTON POST, June 7, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chief-chris-burbank/policing-immigration-a-jo_b_602439.html
(expressing belief of Salt Lake City Chief of Police Chris Burbank that “[s]heriffs and chiefs have long
voiced their concerns that asking officers to be immigration agents will scare undocumented
community members out of calling on law enforcement for help.”). See generally Scott H. Decker et al.,
On the Frontier of Local Law Enforcement: Local Police and Federal Immigration Law, in IMMIGRATION,
CRIME, AND JUSTICE (2009) (surveying law enforcement officials); A. Elena Lacayo, The Impact Of
66
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organizations that study policing as well. They have expressed the same concern that
“[l]ocal police involvement in immigration enforcement could have a chilling effect
on immigrant cooperation . . . . Without this cooperation, law enforcement will have
difficulty apprehending and successfully prosecuting criminals, thereby reducing
overall public safety for the larger community.”67
Recently, fears like these fueled the passage of local policies designed to limit
state and local cooperation with Secure Communities. Local law enforcement
agencies are powerless to resist the rollout of Secure Communities in their
jurisdictions. But they can refuse to help Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) take custody of immigrants identified through the program. And this is exactly
what they did. In the past two years, nearly 300 localities have adopted “antidetainer” policies that restrict the extent to which local officials may continue to
detain individuals in order to hand them over to ICE.68 Because these policies nearly
all came into existence after the end of our study period, they do not undermine the
extent to which the program can be understood an exogenous shock to local police
policy, which is useful for our research design.69 Nonetheless, the policies highlight
the intensity of concerns that Secure Communities will undermine the
trustworthiness and legitimacy of local police. In fact, in California, the legislation
ultimately adopted was aptly named the “Trust Act”—a term that then quickly
became the label applied to pretty much all efforts to resist Secure Communities at
the state or local level.70
The criticism and growing resistance to the program ultimately made the
moniker “Secure Communities” politically toxic. On November 20, 2014, the
Section 287(G) Of The Immigration And Nationality Act On The Latino Community, National Council Of La
Raza (2010), http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/287g_issuebrief_pubstore.pdf (“In a
survey of 54 police chiefs, deputies, and sheriffs, . . . [t]he majority of law enforcement officials . . .
believed that [cooperative enforcement] agreements often severely hinder the ability of police to earn
trust required to implement effective community policing strategies to fight criminal activity.”).
67 Anita Khashu, The Role Of Local Police: Striking A Balance Between Immigration
Enforcement, Police Foundation, (2009); Major Cities Chiefs Immigration Committee
Recommendations for Enforcement of Immigration Laws by Local Police Agencies (2006),
http://www.houstontx.gov/police/pdfs/mcc_position.pdf. See generally Pradine Saint-Fort et al.,
Engaging Police in Immigrant Communities: Promising Practices from the Field, Vera Institute for
Justice (2012).
68 See Catholic Immigration Legal Network, States and Localities That Limit Compliance with
ICE Detainer Requests (July 2015), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/states-andlocalities-limit-compliance-ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014.
69

See Miles & Cox, supra note [], at [] (documenting the policies and their timing).

The Acronym TRUST stands for Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools.” CAL.
GOV’T CODE §§ 7282-7282.5 (West. Supp. 2014); see also Recent Legislation—Trust Act, 127 Harv.
L. Rev. 2593 (2014). Explaining the purpose of the Trust Act, Representative Zoe Lofgren said that
“[w]hat this will do for law enforcement in California is that it will ensure that immigrants collaborate
with law enforcement.” Elise Foley and Roque Planas, Trust Act Signed in California to Limit Deportation
Program, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/05/trust-actsigned_n_4050168.html.
70
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Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, announced that “the Secure
Communities program, as we know it, will be discontinued.” 71 Even his
announcement sounded in procedural justice, conceding that any program of
cooperative immigration enforcement “must be implemented in a way that supports
community policing and sustains the trust of all elements of the community in
working with local law enforcement.”72
Embedded in these public critiques of Secure Communities are two related but
distinct claims about the effect of the program on immigrant communities. The first
is an instrumental claim about perceived risk. The idea is that turning every local
arrest into a point of immigration screening will shape the behavior of an immigrant
whenever (a) a police encounter increases the risk of arrest, and (b) the screening
accompanying arrest increases the risk of federal apprehension or deportation for
either the immigrant or someone she cares about. On this account, immigrants have
no reason to avoid police encounters that have no chance of resulting in an arrest for
themselves or someone they care about. Relatedly, even when arrest is a possibility,
the effects of Secure Communities on immigrant trust will be greater for
unauthorized migrants than for those immigrants who have legal status. 73 For a
person without legal status, any arrest—even one for minor conduct that leads to no
prosecution or conviction—could result in deportation, because the person is
deportable by virtue of her status.74 For a green card holder, however, an arrest poses
a threat only under circumstances where it might result in a conviction for an offense
that would make the noncitizen deportable under the immigration code—a code that
makes certain convictions, but not others, grounds for deportation.75
71 See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Department of Homeland Security, Nov. 20, 2014,
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf, at 1.

Id. at 1-2. While Secure Communities has formally been discontinued, it has been replaced
with a similar program known as the “Priority Enforcement Program,” or PEP. PEP continues,
without change, the core technological component of Secure Communities: the mandatory, biometric
immigration screening of every person arrested by local law enforcement officials. See id. But the
program differs from Secure Communities in two respects. First, PEP narrows the grounds on which
ICE will seek to detain a noncitizen identified through the biometric screening system. While nearly
one-third of the immigrants detained under Secure Communities between 2008 and 2012 had no
criminal conviction at all, PEP’s authorizing memorandum states that, subject to limited exceptions,
“enforcement actions through the new program will only be taken against aliens who are convicted of
specifically enumerated crimes.” Id. Second, PEP narrows considerably the use of immigration
detainers. Instead of issuing detainers, ICE is now required in most cases to issue a simple request for
notification—that is, a request that the local government inform the federal officials of the time when
they plan to release the noncitizen. The idea is that, with this information, federal immigration agents
can show up at the appointed time and effectuate a transfer of custody, without requiring local
officials to hold the immigrant beyond the time when they otherwise would be released from criminal
custody. See id.
72

See Theodore, supra note [], at [] (documenting, in survey results, greater concern about police
contact among unauthorized migrants than other foreign born persons).
73

74

See INA § 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6); INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1).

75

See INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (laying out criminal grounds of deportability).
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While this instrumental claim has played some role in public debate, the critique
of Secure Communities has far more commonly been grounded in perceptions of
legitimacy. The concern is that once immigrants see local police as immigration
enforcers, they will come to doubt the motives of the police—no longer believing
that local police are really concerned about their well being and committed to serving
their interests. In the language of procedural justice, inferences of motive-based trust
and judgments about the fairness of interpersonal treatment lead immigrants to view
local police as less legitimate.76 This loss of legitimacy makes immigrants less likely to
assist the police—regardless of whether a particular interaction is likely to create a risk
of deportation for the immigrant or a loved one.77 Risk assessments are not central to
this account, because cooperation is based more on beliefs about whether it is just
for local police to assist in federal immigration enforcement, about whether such
involvement will lead immigrants to be treated unfairly by the police, and ultimately
about whether involvement undermines the legitimacy of the police.78
Interestingly, the instrumental and legitimacy-based mechanisms lead to
different predictions about who will cooperate less with police and about how much less
they will cooperate. Thus, not only does Secure Communities provide a potential
means of testing theories of legitimacy’s importance for securing community
cooperation, in theory it makes it possible to distinguish legitimacy-based effects
from more instrumental effects.
3.   Resource Neutrality
A second feature of Secure Community that makes it an ideal policy to study is
that it does not directly affect the resources or tactics of the local police. As we
explained above, the program piggybacks on existing arrest and booking practices. It
was carefully designed by the federal government to require no additional effort on
the part of local police: they would continue to make the same arrests they had
always made, and the federal government would simply use those arrests as point of
immigration screening, as a way to pluck noncitizens out of the back end of the local
criminal justice system.
This unique structure helps isolate the legitimacy-based effects of the policy.
Most other law enforcement policies that have been studied by procedural justice
scholars do much more than simply shock perceptions of legitimacy. The policies
typically change police tactics in significant ways, often at great cost. Community
policing strategies that emphasize putting more officers out on foot patrol, for
example, reflect a significant tactical change that diverts resources towards cops
walking the beat and away from other crime fighting strategies. These changes in
76

See Tyler, supra note [], at [].

See, e.g., Khashu, supra note [] (emphasizing the “fragility of the relationship between the police
and immigrants,” and the way in which word of mouth about an isolated incident can create
widespread difficulty in securing the cooperation of members of the immigrant community”).
77

78

See supra text accompanying notes []-[].
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tactics and resources might themselves change the level of community cooperation,
making it hard to tell whether any observed change is the result of perceptions of
legitimacy or instead something more mundane—like the increased opportunities for
conversations with police officers who find themselves out on foot more frequently.
The fact that Secure Communities does not entail these confounding effects is
valuable, and it distinguishes the program not just from other law enforcement
programs generally but from previous cooperative immigration federalism initiatives
in particular. The 287(g) program, for example, often involved local police spending
time investigating immigration violations and making immigration arrests, which
might have had negative consequences from crime fighting.79
That said, it is important to note that there are two indirect ways in which—at
least in theory—Secure Communities have affected local policing tactics or
resources. First, it is possible that local police changed their arrest practices in
response to the activation of Secure Communities—say, by choosing to arrest a
much larger number of persons stopped for driving without a license. In other work
we are exploring this possibility.80 The second possibility is that Secure Communities
could chew up local law enforcement resources if local agencies had to spend large
sums of money detaining immigrants on behalf of the federal government. As we
noted above, the federal government regularly placed detainers on noncitizens
identified through the program. Detainers requested that the local law enforcement
agency hold the immigrant for up to forty-eight hours after any otherwise-scheduled
release, in order to give ICE time to take custody of the immigrant.81 And detainers
often resulted in more than forty-eight hours of additional detention, because many
local governments adopted policies of refusing to grant pre-trial release to
noncitizens against whom a detainer had been lodged.82 Nonetheless, while a number
of local governments have complained about the costs of complying with detainer
requests,83 there is little evidence that these costs were anywhere near large enough to
have had a meaningful effect on the functioning of local law enforcement agencies.84
79 See, e.g., Maria Fernanda Parra-Chico, An Up-Close Perspective: The Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Laws by State and Local Police, 7 SEATTLE J. SOCIAL JUSTICE 321 (2008).
80

See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Do Local Police Profile Immigrants? (work-in-progress).

81

See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7.

See Ingrid Eagley, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013) (documenting local policies in Los Angeles and elsewhere).
82

83 See, e.g., Letter from Toni Preckwinkle, Board of Commissioners of Cook County, to John
Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/
immigrantjustice.org/files/Preckwinkle%20Response%20to%20Morton%20%2801%2019%2012%2
9.pdf.
84 Calculating the local cost of complying with detainers is extremely difficult for three reasons.
First, it is hard because one must decide which costs to include: for example, should the costs of
pretrial detention be included if that detention is the result of a local policy relating to criminal
defendants with detainers, rather than the direct result of the detainer request? Second, it is often
challenging to calculate the marginal (as opposed to average) cost of these additional days of
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B.   Nationwide Rollout as a Natural Experiment
Secure Communities, unlike most federal policies and programs, could not be
activated everywhere in the country at once. Resource bottlenecks, technological
constraints, and the sheer scope of the task of communicating with the roughly
thirty-one thousand booking locations around the country necessitated a staggered
rollout.85 Over a period of four years, beginning on October 27, 2008, the federal
government rolled out the program on a county-by-county basis. By spring of 2012,
Secure Communities had been formally activated in all but a handful of counties, and
by January 2013, it was completely activated nationwide.86 Figure 1 provides a visual
representation of the pattern of rollout.

detention—and those marginal costs may depend on factors that fluctuate, like how close to capacity
the jail is at any given time. Third, cost assessments are complicated by the fact that the federal
government provides at least partial reimbursement for some of the costs local governments incur
detaining unauthorized migrants. See State Criminal Alien Assistance Program,
https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=86.
Perhaps the best study available of detainer compliance costs comes from King County,
Washington. Researchers there estimated that noncitizens subject to detainers stayed in jail, on
average, 29.2 days longer than others—with the vast majority of this time attributable to a local policy
of denying bail to those against whom detainers had been lodged. See Katherine Beckett & Heather
Evans, Immigration Detainer Requests in King County, Washington (2013). They also estimated that
refusing to comply with any detainer requests would have saved King County $1.8 million in 2011, see
id. at 21, which amounts to a bit more than 1% of the county’s detention budget. See King County
Budget FY 2011, Adult and Juvenile Detention F-13.
85 See Cox & Miles, supra note [], at 95-102 (explaining the reasons for, and the pattern of,
program rollout).

See ICE, Secure Communities Activated Jurisdictions (last visited Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf.
86
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Figure 1. The Pattern of Secure Communities Rollout
Counties Activated Prior to Oct. 1, 2009

Counties Activated Prior to Oct. 1, 2011

Counties Activated Prior to Oct. 1, 2010

Counties Activated Prior to Oct. 1, 2012

This staggered sequence of rollout creates a quasi-natural experiment in the
consequences of immigrant trust and perceived police legitimacy on law enforcement
effectiveness. The program was applied uniformly to over 3,000 counties, generating
many experiments rather than just one.87 These experiments occurred over time, and
the timing of each experiment was determined by the federal government, which
dictated the sequence of rollout. It prohibited local governments from formally
opting out of Secure Communities even though elected officials in some localities
wished not to participate. 88 Moreover, the program’s structure made informal
87 Though the screening system operates identically in all jurisdictions, the intensity of the
treatment does turn on local policing intensity. We discuss this possibility later in the paper and
provide direct measures of the program’s intensity.

Initially, there was some confusion about whether Secure Communities was mandatory, in
part because DHS failed to provide clear public guidance, and in part because the agency initially
employed a practice of entering into Memoranda of Understanding with state governments (though
not with local governments or law enforcement agencies). As soon as some states began to resist
signing these agreements, however, the government made clear that the agreements were not required
because the program required no actions by state or local officials; all that was required was a
rerouting of the fingerprint data stream among the federal agencies. See Office of Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security, Communication Regarding Participation in Secure Communities 4
(2012), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/ 2012/OIG_12-66_Mar12.pdf
88
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noncompliance with the screening system practically impossible. Once Secure
Communities is activated in a county, local authorities have no way to share the
fingerprints of arrestees with the FBI but not with DHS. The only way a local law
enforcement agency could prevent DHS’s immigration check from taking place
would be to stop fingerprinting arrestees altogether—an extremely unlikely
possibility.
In earlier work, we explored in detail the determinants of Secure Communities
activation using proportional hazard analysis.89 We found that, while the timing of
activation was not wholly random, it appeared to mirror federal enforcement
priorities for immigration generally rather than for crime control. The strongest
correlates of an early activation were a county’s location on the southern border and
the fraction of the county’s population that was Hispanic.90 Although Hispanic and
foreign-born populations correlate closely with each other, we found that, after
controlling for other factors, only the Hispanic population fraction had a statistically
significant relationship to activation timing.91
C.  Clearance Rates as a Measure of Cooperation
That leaves the question of how to measure changes in cooperation produced
by Secure Communities’ de-legitimating effects. As noted above, procedural justice
studies have focused almost exclusively on measuring beliefs—likely because it is so
difficult to measure cooperation directly. But there is an alternative to measuring
cooperation directly: measuring cooperation’s consequences. Criminologists and
other scholars have long argued that police are more likely to solve crimes when
there are higher levels of community engagement and cooperation with law
enforcement.92 The rate at which police “solve” crimes, therefore, provides a proxy
for community cooperation.
The crime-solving rate, also known as a “clearance rate,” is widely recorded by
law enforcement agencies. The FBI collects these data from every law enforcement
agency in the country and publishes them annually in the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR). The UCR reports clearances for seven crimes that make up what are
known at the FBI Index Crimes.93 Four of the crimes are violent offenses: murder,
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Three are property crimes: burglary, larceny,
and motor vehicle theft.94 A crime is “cleared” for purposes of the UCR when the
89

See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 CHI. L. REV. 87 (2012).

90

See id. at 118-122.

91

See id.

See, e.g., REISS, supra note []; Schulhofer et al., supra note [], at [];obert J. Sampson, S. W.
Raudenbush & F. Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277
SCIENCE 918 (1997).
92

We obtained data on “clearance rates” from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). See
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr.
93

94 Many of these crimes are the types that critics of cooperative immigration federalism contend
will be harder to solve when local police are involved in some way in federal immigration
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offender is arrested, charged with the offense, and turned over to the court for
prosecution. 95 (Crimes can also be cleared by “exceptional means” in rare cases
where arrest is impossible for one reason or another.)96 The “clearance rate” is thus
defined as the ratio of cleared offenses to the total number of reported offenses. 97
To get a sense of how widely clearance rates vary by crime, Table 1 provides
summary statistics for our clearance rate data. (Part III describes the construction of
our dataset in more detail.) The patterns match the usual patterns seen for clearance
rates in the criminology literature. Violent crimes are cleared much more often than
property crimes. The gap in their clearance rates is nearly thirty percentage points.
There are also much bigger differences in clearance rates within the category of
violent crime than within property crimes. Two violent crimes—murders and
aggravated assaults—were cleared more than half the time. By contrast, robberies
were cleared less than a third of the time. Murder and aggravated assault also had the
highest variance in their clearance rates, reflecting wide differences across counties in
the frequency with which their police clear these offenses. Among property crimes,
clearance rates were much lower and occupied a narrower range. Larceny had highest
clearance rate among property offenses at 19.2%, and burglary had the lowest at
12.8%. Variance across counties was also much lower for property offenses than for
violent crimes.

enforcement. See, e.g., Harris, supra note __, at 392 (murder, robbery); Idilbi, supra note __, at 1731
(attempted murder, rape)
95 See FBI, Uniform Crime Report: Offenses Cleared (2013), http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-lawenforcement/clearances/clearancetopic_final.pdf. The vast majority of cleared offenses are cleared by
arrest.

Cases are cleared by exceptional means in limited situations where elements beyond the
control of the law enforcement agency prevent it from arresting and formally charging an offender
who has been identified by the police. This might occur when, for example, the offender dies before
he can be arrested. See id.
96

97 The quality of clearance data is subject to well known criticisms. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III,
Does Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness? 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1151-55 (1998). As long as any mismeasurement in clearances is uncorrelated with Secure Communities, it should affect not bias our
estimates. Rather it should only reduce the precision of our estimates. We have no reason to believe
that Secure Community influenced the reporting of clearances.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Clearance Rates of FBI Index Crimes
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

N

All Index Crimes

.2799

.1322

292,551

Violent Crimes
Murder
Rape
Robbery
Aggravated Assault

.4529
.5135
.3738
.2884
.5256

.2181
.3581
.2764
.2196
.5384

265,909
73,522
168,252
152,140
258,867

Property Crimes
Burglary
Larceny
Motor Vehicle Theft

.1730
.1277
.1919
.1617

.1009
.1065
.1094
.1784

291,073
277,584
287,354
249,728

Other Crimes
Simple Assault

.5642

.1983

265,434

Notes: Observations are monthly, county-level data from 2004-2012. Means and standard deviations
are weighted by population.

Clearance rates have long been studied by criminologists, many of whom seek to
test sociologist Donald Black’s theory of law.98 Black hypothesized that society was
stratified in multiple ways and that persons occupying lower social status receive
“less law” than those occupying higher ones.99 An implication of this theory is when
police exercise discretion in choosing which cases to investigate, they are more likely
to pursue and make arrests in offenses with high status victims. Thus, discretionary
or extra-legal factors primarily determine which cases police are more likely to clear.
Criminologists have attempted to test this prediction by looking for correlations
between the probability that a crime is cleared and measures of the victim’s social
disadvantage. Most of these studies examine homicide cases because it is the offense
for which the most details about victim characteristics are available. Their primary
measures of social disadvantage are the victim’s demographic characteristics. The
studies commonly identify youth, women, and racial minorities as socially
disadvantaged and predict that their clearance rates will be lower than those of older
See Donald Black, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976); see also, e.g., Kenneth J. Litwin, A Multilevel
Multvariate Analysis of Factors Affecting Homicide Clearance, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 327, 32830 (2004); Aki Roberts, Predictors of Homicide Clearance by Arrest: An Event History Analysis of NIBRS
Incidents, 11 HOMICIDE STUDIES 82, 83 (2007); Tanya Tussler, Explaining the Changing Nature of Homicide
Clearance in Canada, 20 INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE REV. 366, 368-369 (2010); Graham C. Ousey & Matthew
R. Lee, To Know the Unknown: The Decline in Homicide Clearance Rates, 1980-2000, 35 CRIM. JUSTICE REV.
41, 43-44 (2010).
98

99

See BLACK, supra note [], at [].
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white males. Yet many of these predictions are not borne out consistently in
empirical studies. Most research finds that police clear homicides with white victims
more often than those with non-white victims. 100 But many studies also find,
contrary to the predictions, that police are more likely to clear homicides involving
women than men, and involving younger rather than older victims.101
A rival theory to Black’s idea of victim devaluation is that the probability of
clearance depends mainly on the nature of the offense rather than the identity of the
victim. In this account, police face strong incentives to secure arrests in all homicide
cases and a victim’s characteristics do not influence the amount of effort police are
willing to invest in investigating homicides.102 Clearance rates are instead primarily a
function of the evidence, and the nature of the offense largely determines the
amount and type of evidence available to police. Thus, clearance rates are the
product of factors over which police exercise little discretion.
Empirical studies have found greater support for the non-discretionary account.
This vein of research uses aspects of the criminal incident as proxies for the
availability of evidence and tests whether these proxies correlate with the likelihood
of clearance. For example, police clear homicides involving weapons other than guns
at higher rates, a pattern that is consistent with shootings leaving less forensic
evidence behind for police than stabbings or other forms of physical attack.
Similarly, homicides in private residences or involving family members have higher
clearance probabilities. 103 Most recent studies conclude that these situational
characteristics better explain homicide clearances than the discretionary theory.104
Our focus, of course, is on neither victims nor offense characteristics. Instead
we are interested in the connection between levels of community cooperation and
clearance rates. The literature on clearance rates has long argued that community
cooperation is a crucial input in producing arrests. As one scholar summarized, “a
theme that runs through many of the previous studies was stated by Reiss several

100

See Riedel, supra note at 1153-55.

101

See id.

See, e.g., Litwin, supra note [], at 331 (describing organizational pressure within police
departments to solve all homicides).
102

103

See id. at 1157-59.

See Litwin, supra note [], at 345 (“Overwhelming support exists for the importance of
nondiscretionary factors in understanding homicide clearances in a given time period”); Roberts, supra
note [], at 89 (“The findings of the current analysis support the second perspective’s claim that police
discretion based on victim and offender characteristics is minimized in homicide cases, with
availability of physical evidence and information being the decisive factors”); Tussler, supra note [], at
379-80 (“This research showed little support for Black’s (1976) theory of law . . . Nondiscretionary
factors substantially affect clearance rates”); Ousey and Lee, supra note [], at 52 (reporting that
empirical “models offer little support for the discretionary perspective” and are “somewhat consistent
with the nondiscretionary perspective”).
104
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decades ago, ‘There is no feasible way to solve most crimes except by securing the
cooperation of citizens to link a person to the crime.’”105
This theme is reflected in studies of all perspectives. One researcher, working
within Black’s victim-centric theory, described four statistically significant results for
variables as diverse as home ownership rates within a locality and the victim’s
ethnicity as reflecting “some aspect of witness willingness to provide useful
information to police.”106 Clearance scholars observing correlations inconsistent with
Black’s victim-centric theory have also suggested that the patterns they find reflect
differences in the degree of community cooperation with police. For example, one
study found that homicides with Latino victims were much less likely to be cleared
relative to those with white victims. The author conjectured that this pattern may
result from community members’ reluctance to provide information to the police,
which could arise from Latinos’ fear of revealing their immigrant status to
authorities. 107 Similarly, another study considered the possibility that the lower
clearance rates of black homicide victims may not indicate that police assign a lower
priority to investigating such crimes. Rather, the lower clearance rates may indicate
the “level of witness cooperation with investigators” and specifically that community
members are “too frightened or alienated to talk to the police.”108
Thus, criminologists studying the determinants of clearance rates have often
alluded to a central claim of procedural justice theory. But they have not engaged
that literature directly, and the procedural justice literature has paid little attention to
the clearance literature. Consequently, the two literatures have remained entirely
disconnected.109 And despite the claims in clearance rate scholarship about the effect
community cooperation has on crime clearance, existing scholarship has yet to test
those claims directly.110
See Riedel, supra note [], at 1159. See also Ousey & Lee, supra note [], at 45 (describing how the
public’s willingness to provide information to the police influences their ability to gather evidence that
leads to arrests).
105

106 Litwin, supra note [], at 347. This author adds, “In Chicago, nearly two thirds of police
officers agreed with the statement, ‘without citizen cooperation, the majority of crimes would never
be solved.’” Id. at [] (quoting Wesley G. Skogan et al., ON THE BEAT: POLICE AND COMMUNITY
PROBLEM SOLVING 235 (1999).
107

See Litwin, supra note [], at 339-40.

108 Edward R. Maguire et al., Why Homicide Clearance Rates Decrease: Evidence from the Caribbean, 20
POLICING & SOCIETY 373, 377, 386-87 (quoting police, citing survey evidence on residents’ fear of
reprisals, and discussing police mistreatment of the public). See also Janice L. Puckett & Richard J.
Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a More Complete Conceptual
Framework, J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171, 183 (2003) (reporting that “census-tract race
composition measures matter in ways that suggest less information and cooperation from citizens in
African American communities”).
109

Ousey & Lee, supra note [], at 53 (referring to the “trust people have in the police”).

One reason for this failure is likely, as we observed above, the simple fact that cooperation is
difficult for researchers to observe directly. See id. (“Most importantly, the degree of police-citizen
integration is an inherently difficult concept to operationalize with macrosocial data . . .”). Standard
110
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Our innovation is to combine and build on these two literatures—one
concerned primarily with the reasons why people cooperate with law enforcement,
the other concerned with the conditions that promote or impair effective law
enforcement. For our immediate purposes, this provides us with a way to plausibly
measure community cooperation with law enforcement, without having to rely on
surveys about attitudes or laboratory experiments. Where a community is willing to
cooperate with police in responding to crime, the rate at which police secure arrests
for reported offenses should be higher. This metric has shortcomings, which we
discuss below. But a key virtue is that it allows theories of cooperation with police to
be connected to actual law enforcement outcomes, something that the procedural
justice literature has heretofore not done.111
In addition to employing clearance rates as a proxy for the degree of community
cooperation, this Article makes an additional contribution to the study of clearance
rates themselves. It is one of the very first (if not the first) to utilize variation in a
specific law enforcement policy to identify the impact of community cooperation on
clearance rates. Research on clearance rates has for the most part not assessed the
impact of specific law enforcement programs.112 A focus on public policy is almost
entirely missing from the clearance rate literature. Its concern has been identifying
the sociological factors that influence clearance, rather than evaluating the effects of
discrete legal policies. Some studies include control variables for the number of
reported offenses per police officer, which proxies for the workload of officers, but
they often, but not always, find that lower workload associates with a higher

datasets of offending and law enforcement activity do not typically have quantitative measures of the
specific types of evidence available to police in a criminal incident, whether it is physical evidence or a
witness’s testimony. Even if an effort were made to collect such details, it would likely encounter the
difficulties due to the confidentiality of some cooperation and perhaps subjective judgments of
whether a witness was truly or fully cooperating. These reasons make it unsurprising that clearance
scholars have not tested directly the importance of community cooperation and that procedural
justice scholars have relied primarily on survey evidence.
111 Our approach does, of course, have its own empirical limitations, as does any empirical
analysis. By focusing on geographic aggregates and a broader range of offenses, detailed information
about the circumstances of the offense and the victims are not available. While we give up this finegrained information, we gain considerable breadth: our analysis studies clearance rates for the full set
of FBI Index I offenses, for example, while nearly all existing work focuses exclusively on homicide.
See sources cited supra notes []-[]. But see Jang et al., supra note [], at 532 (considering all Part I
offenses); Aki Roberts, The Influences of Incident and Contextual Characteristics on Crime Clearance of Nonlethal
Violence: A Multilevel Event History Analysis, 36 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 61, (2008) (examining violent crimes
other than homicide). We believe this and the other advantages described above outweigh this
limitation.
112 An exception is Hyunseok Jang et al., Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates, 36
J. CRIM. JUSTICE 529 (2008). This article tests the impact of broken windows policing using fifteen
years of data from 35 Texas police departments, and it finds that the estimated effect is not consistent
across offense categories. Its measure of broken windows policing is not whether a police department
officially embraced such a strategy, but instead the share of arrests for certain categories of crime
thought be priorities under the broken windows approach. See id. at 533.

LEGITIMACY AND COOPERATION

31

clearance rate.113 But again, these results are correlational, leaving the correct causal
inference unclear. It could be that policies that lower workloads increase clearance
rates because officers can invest more effort in each case. Or, policies that clear more
crimes may lower criminal activity because clearances signal to potential offenders
the detection probability.
Before proceeding, we should note an important aspect of the way in which we
are using clearance rates. Some prior research has treated clearance rates as a metric
of police efficacy.114 This interpretation is problematic. As many have pointed out,
the efficacy of police depends not only the ability to solve crimes when they occur,
but also to prevent crimes in the first instance.115 It is possible that an enforcement
effort which is effective in reducing offending may also cause the clearance rate to
fall. 116 This is so because clearance rates are the ratio of crimes cleared to crimes
reported and, therefore, are endogenous to enforcement policies that influence the
rate of offending.117 While this criticism is important, our approach does not assume
that clearance rates are a measure of, or sufficient statistic for, police efficacy. Rather,
we seek to test whether policies that shape public attitudes toward the police can
influence cooperation and thereby alter the frequency with which police clear crimes.
In addition, as we show below, Secure Communities had no effect on crime rates.
Accordingly, it is unlikely to have caused a change in criminal opportunities that
would impair the ability to detect an impact on clearances.
III. SECURE COMMUNITIES’ IMPACT ON COOPERATION
Procedural justice theory predicts that activating Secure Communities in a
jurisdiction should undermine the legitimacy of local police and, consequently,
reduce cooperation by immigrants. Reduced cooperation, criminologists and other
scholars have long argued, makes it difficult for the police to solve crimes.118 Thus,
our main prediction is that activating Secure Communities in a county will reduce the
rate at which crimes are solved in the county.
113

See id. at 531 (collecting citations).

See, e.g., Alexandre Mas, Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance, 121 QUART. J. ECON. 783
(2006); Paul-Philippe Paré, Richard B. Felson, & Marc Ouimet, Community Variation in Crime Clearance:
A Multilevel Analysis with Comments on Assessing Police Performance, 23 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 243
(2007); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty Year Perspective on Miranda’s
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998).
114

See Daniel S. Nagin, Robert M. Solow, & Cynthia Lum, Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and
Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74, 84 (2015).
115

116 See Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 13, 19-21 (2011) (presenting an example in which an enforcement
program deters marginal offenses and thereby lowers both the offending and clearance rates).

See Philip J. Cook, The Clearance Rate as a Measure of Criminal Justice Effectiveness, 11 J. PUBLIC
ECON. 135, 136 (1979) (offering a theoretical model showing that if offenders adapt to improvements
in the efficacy of police, clearance rates may remain unchanged).
117

118

See, e.g., REISS, supra note []; Schulhofer et al., supra note [], at [].
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This Part evaluates that prediction by exploiting Secure Communities’ staggered
rollout. The staggered rollout permits us to use a statistical technique, known as
differences-in-differences, which mirrors the randomized control trials widely used in
medical research. The goal of the typical medical trial is to measure whether a
particular treatment improves health outcomes. To determine this, medical
researchers randomize subjects into two groups: a treatment group that receives the
intervention and a control group that does not. For each group, health outcomes are
measured on two dates: before and after the date the treatment is administered. The
treatment is then estimated by comparing the change in the health outcomes of the
treatment group before and after the administration of treatment, relative to a similar
before-after change in the health outcomes of the control group.
Such estimates are called differences-in-differences because they rely on two sets
of before-after comparisons: one for the treatment group and another for the control
group. The before-after comparison for the control group (the first “difference”) is
subtracted from the before-after comparison for the treatment group (the second
“difference”). This means that any changes in the treatment group are measured
relative to any changes in the control group, which excludes the possibility that some
omitted third factor—like the simple passage of time—caused any changes observed
in the health of the treatment group. Randomization of subjects into treatment and
control groups is also important. It assures that systematic differences in the
treatment and control groups, such as preexisting trends in their health, do not
account for any of the estimated changes in outcomes.119
Social scientists typically cannot conduct randomized control trials on social
policies. Instead, they must rely on naturally occurring policy variations that, after
controlling for other factors, are plausibly random. Part II demonstrated that Secure
Communities is just such a natural experiment. This permits us to use differences-indifferences estimation to identify the causal effect of lower levels of legitimacy on
community cooperation.120
A.  The Effect on Clearance Rates
We operationalize the differences-in-differences approach in a multivariate
regression framework that controls simultaneously for a number of factors, beyond
just perceived legitimacy, that may influence levels of community cooperation. 121
119 JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN
EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 227-43 (2009); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and
Employment: A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772
(1994).
120 Mark R. Rosenzweig & Kenneth I. Wolpin, “Natural Experiments” in Economics, 38 J. ECON.
LIT. 827 (2000).
121 We estimated ordinary least squares regressions, with the estimating equation taking the form
Cit = g(Activateit)δ + Xitβ + αi + αt + εit. The dependent variable Cit is the clearance rate in county i at
calendar month t. The clearance rate is defined as the number of offenses cleared divided by the total
number of offenses. The independent variable Activateit represents whether Secure Communities is
active in county i on date t. Several different functional forms of g(•) are used to capture different

LEGITIMACY AND COOPERATION

33

Thus, in addition to information on our treatment (Secure Communities) and
predicted effect (cooperation as proxied by clearance rates), we collected a large
amount of demographic information about each county, as well as information on
each county’s median income, from the Census Bureau.122 It is worth noting that the
decennial census does not determine the number of noncitizens in each county.123
But it does determine for each county the number of foreign-born and Hispanic
persons, and these groups are closely correlated with noncitizen status.
Because Secure Communities was activated month-by-month at the county
level, the unit of observation in the regression models is a county-month. Thus, the
assembled data is a panel of monthly, county-level observations. The observation
period runs from 2004 to 2012: it ends in 2012 because that is the most recent year
for which nationwide clearance rate data is available, and it begins in 2004 to balance
the number of years before and after Secure Communities launch in late 2008. The
full dataset thus contains nearly 300,000 observations.
Table 2 reports the results of the clearance rate regressions. Each of the four
columns in the table represents a different regression model. These different models
capture two refinements to our basic differences-in-differences approach.
The first refinement relates to how we measure the “treatment” of Secure
Communities in each county. Our basic measure of the treatment is binary: the
program is either “off” or “on” in a particular county. 124 Yet even though the
program was applied uniformly to every activated county, the intensity of the
program’s treatment may have varied across counties. To account for this possibility,
we obtained detailed operational data on Secure Communities through a series of
FOIA requests. These data, provided by the Department of Homeland Security,
include the precise number of persons taken into custody by ICE under the Secure

ways of conceptualizing activation. The vector Xit contains a set of county- and date-varying control
variables that are commonly included in studies of crime, including the fraction of the county
population that is foreign born, the fraction that is Hispanic, the fraction that is Black, the fraction of
female-headed households, population density, median household income, and the number of sworn
police officers per 100,000 residents. (Police employment, median income, and population density are
expressed in logs in the regressions.) The terms αi and αt are fixed effects for county i and calendar
date t, respectively. The term εit captures the error. The regressions are weighted by a county’s
population, and the standard errors are clustered by county.
122

See USA Counties (Census Bureau), http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml.

The decennial census last collected information on citizenship status in 2000. After the 2000
census, the census “long form”—which contained the citizenship status question—was discontinued
and replaced by the American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS uses monthly surveys to sample
the population characteristics previously surveyed by the long form. See U.S. Census Bureau,
American Community Survey: Design and Methodology (2006), https://www.census.gov/
history/pdf/ACSHistory.pdf.
123

This binary measure is operationalized using a series of binary indicator variables that take the
value of “1” when Secure Communities in active in a county during a particular month and the value
“0” otherwise.
124
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Communities in each county and month.125 The data reveal widely varying rates of
ICE detention across counties. Unsurprisingly, detentions under the program have
been concentrated in counties with the largest foreign-born populations. 126 This
suggests that relying exclusively on a binary measure of activation might introduce
error into our measurement of the program’s treatment and lead us to underestimate
its effect (a problem economists describe as attenuation bias). For this reason, we use
ICE detention rates as a continuous measure of the program’s intensity in a
county.127
In addition to ameliorating the problem of attenuation bias, this direct measure
of the program’s intervention in theory permits us to distinguish between the
instrumental and legitimacy-based accounts of immigrant cooperation. If immigrants
are attentive to the actual risk that a police interaction will lead to negative
immigration consequences, then the detention rate under the program may be the
most theoretically appropriate measure of the program’s intervention. But if, on the
other hand, immigrants are focused primarily on the perceived legitimacy of local
police, the simple fact of activation may be the most appropriate treatment
measure.128
The second refinement provides alternate ways of controlling for differences in
clearance rates across counties. The baseline regression includes “fixed effects” (a
dummy variable) for each county. These control variables remove any pre-treatment
differences in clearance rates across counties prior to testing the program’s impact. It
is possible, however, that counties differ not just in their pre-treatment clearance
rates but in the trend of those rates prior to the activation of Secure Communities. If
clearances were trending upward in some counties, but trending downward in others,
there is a risk of mistaking these general trends in clearance rates for the program’s
impact. In our research design, this would occur if counties that had declining
clearance rates also happened to be more likely to be activated earlier under Secure
Communities.129 To avoid this possibility, we ran alternate regression specifications
125 In addition to data on detentions, the Department of Homeland Security also provided, for
each county-month, the number of database submissions and “hits,” as well as the number of persons
deported pursuant to the program. This gives us a snapshot of the enforcement pipeline from the
point of initial local arrest to ultimate federal deportation.
126

See Miles and Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime?, supra note [], at [].

In the regressions, this measure is implemented by interacting the dummy variable for
activation with the ICE detention rate. The ICE detention rate is defined, for each county-month
observation, as the cumulative number of persons detained under the program in the county through
that month. In Part III.A.3 below we also evaluate the effect of defining detention rates in different
ways.
127

128 This presumes, of course, that community members have information about the policy’s
activation in their community. If they learn about it only because they begin to notice that an increase
in the number of local criminal arrestees who are getting turned over to federal immigration
authorities, then the ICE detention figures may be more appropriate even from the procedural justice
perspective.
129 In related work, we show that crime rates fell steadily over this time period, especially in
counties with high foreign-born populations. See Miles &Cox, supra note [], at [].
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that include county-level trends rather than fixed effects. In effect, these
specifications remove a linear trend from each county before testing for the impact
of the program.
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Table 2. Impact of Secure Communities on the Clearance Rate of FBI Index Crimes
Explanatory Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.0024
(.0045)

.0028
(.0049)

-.0018
(.0013)

-.0013
(.0015)

Activated x 75th Percentile of
Fraction Pop. Foreign Born

-.0003
(.0049)

-.0001
(.0040)

-.0019
(.0013)

-.0016
(.0016)

Activated x Below 75th
Percentile of Fraction Pop.
Foreign Born

.0108**
(.0039)

.0088**
(.0040)

.0028
(.0017)

.0013
(.0018)

Activated x 75th Percentile of
Fraction Pop. Hispanic

-.0024
(.0051)

.0003
(.0063)

-.0021
(.0013)

-.0016
(.0017)

Activated x Below 75th
Percentile of Fraction Pop.
Hispanic

.0111*
(.0041)

.0060
(.0040)

-.0029*
(.0015)

-.0002
(.0017)

Activated x Border County

.0191**
(.0063)

.0186*
(.0099)

.0029
(.0012)

.0042*
(.0025)

Activated x Not Border
County

.0018
(.0044)

.0024
(.0048)

-.0023
(.0013)

-.0017
(.0016)

Activated x First Year

-.0063
(.0084)

.0019
(.0084)

-.0026
(.0021)

-.0001
(.0026)

Activated x Second Year

.0041
(.0052)

-.0022
(.0056)

-.0012
(.0014)

-.0028
(.0020)

Activated x Third Year

.0097*
(.0049)

.0047
(.0051)

.0009
(.0020)

-.0019
(.0020)

Activated x Fourth Year

-.0060
(.0051)

-.0001
(.0053)

-.0012
(.0026)

.0035
(.0026)

Activated

Activated

Persons in ICE
custody x
Activated

Persons in ICE
custody x
Activated

N

Y

N

Y

Regression Specification A
Activated
Regression Specification B

Regression Specification C

Regression Specification D

Regression Specification E

Measure of Secure
Communities?
Includes County-level Trends?

Notes: OLS regression estimates, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the monthly
clearance rate of FBI index crimes. The table reports regression coefficients for the listed explanatory
variable, with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for control variables are omitted in order to
conserve space. N = 267,010. Number of counties in sample = 2,864.
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1.   Baseline Estimates for FBI Index Offenses
Table 2 begins with Regression Specification A, which provides a set of baseline
estimates for whether Secure Communities’ activation influenced clearance rates.
The regressions in the first two columns use our binary measure of program
activation. The regressions in the second two columns replace the binary measure of
program activation with our continuous measure of the program’s intensity within a
county. Labels at the bottom of each column indicate whether that column’s model
includes county-level fixed effects or, instead, county-level trends.
Specification A suggests that Secure Communities had little effect on the ability
of local law enforcement to solve crimes. In fact, the first two estimates for this
specification—the ones utilizing the binary measure of activation—are positive. If
taken at face value, this would suggest that clearance rates rose as a result of the
program’s activation, precisely the opposite of the predictions of procedural justice
theory.
While the estimates change signs when we use detention rates as the treatment
measure, all of the baseline estimates are very small in magnitude, and none of them
are statistically significant. For example, the differences-in-differences estimate in
column (2)—which is the largest in magnitude—implies that Secure Communities
raised the clearance rate of index crimes by about one quarter of one percentage point
(0.25%). Even if this estimate were statistically significant (which again it is not), it is
miniscule relative to an average clearance rate for all index crimes of nearly 28%. The
magnitude of the negatively signed coefficients are even smaller. The magnitude of
the estimate in column (4), for example, implies that a 10% increase in detentions
under Secure Communities would lower the clearance rate by .013%. This implied
response is very small.
These estimated effects are not just close to zero; they are also very precisely
estimated. To give the most generous interpretation of the estimates for any
clearance-reducing effect, consider the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval.
For the baseline estimate in column (1) of Specification A, the bottom of the
confidence interval is -.0070. The implied effect of this lower bound is very small: it
amounts to a less than one percentage point reduction in clearance rates, which is
tiny when compared to the sample mean clearance rate of about 28%. Moreover, the
manner in which Secure Communities is measured does not influence this
conclusion. When the program’s intensity is measured using the rate of federal
detention (in column (3)) rather than mere activation, for example, the lower bound
of the 95% confidence interval remains close to zero: -.0045. The precision of the
estimates is such that if activation of Secure Communities caused even a one
percentage point reduction in clearance rates, it would be statistically significant.
Thus, the failure to detect an effect of Secure Communities on clearance rates is not
due to a lack of precision; it is due to the absence of any actual effects.
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2.   Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
In addition to the possibility that the policy’s treatment varied from county to
county, a county’s response to that treatment might vary with its characteristics—
such as the proportion of immigrants in its population. This raises the possibility that
the treatment effect will be heterogeneous. To account for this, each of the
subsequent panels in Table 2 reports a different specification of the Secure
Communities variables to overcome any measurement error and to test for
heterogeneous effects. Specification B decomposes the basic estimate into two
components: one for counties that are likely to have high immigrant concentrations
(measured as having shares of the foreign-born population at or above the 75th
percentile) and one for counties likely to have low concentrations (below the 75th
percentile). Specification C makes a similar comparison for counties with high and
low proportions of their populations who are Hispanic. Specification D makes a
comparison between counties that are on and not on the southern border. The final
specification, Specification E, decomposes the treatment variables by the year in
which Secure Communities was activated in a county because DHS may have sought
to introduce the program earlier in places where it would have the greatest impact.
None of these specifications changes the inference drawn from the baseline
estimates: Secure Communities did not affect the clearance rate of FBI index crimes.
Most of the estimates are statistically insignificant and small. The estimates that are
largest in absolute value—such as an estimate of .0191 for border counties in column
(1)—are all positively signed, precisely the opposite of the prediction that the
program may lower clearance rates. The largest negatively signed estimates are for
counties with proportionately small foreign-born populations in column (3). But
again these (insignificant) estimates contradict the prediction that the impact of the
program in these counties should be modest or even zero because the size of the
affected population is proportionately small.
3.   Sanctuary Cities and Anti-Detainer Policies
Another important way in which counties might differ is in the efforts they
make to combat the de-legitimating effects of Secure Communities. As we explained
earlier, counties cannot avoid participating in the mandatory fingerprint screening
system at the core of Secure Communities. But they could try to interfere with the
federal government’s ability to take custody of immigrants identified through the
program. They have attempted to do this in two ways. First, some local governments
have adopted sanctuary policies. 130 These policies restrict local police and other
government actors from cooperating with federal immigration enforcement. The
specific nature of these policies varies across jurisdictions, but the common element
of these policies is that by preventing local officials from cooperating with federal
immigration efforts, they created a zone of safety or sanctuary for immigrants. The
130 See Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 133 (2008) (describing the
evolution of sanctuary policies over time).
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adoption of sanctuary policies occurred mostly before the launch of Secure
Communities.131 The second way in which communities may constrain the ability of
the federal government to take custody of immigrants is through so-called antidetainer policies, which are a direct response to Secure Communities. Under such a
policy, local authorities refuse to honor requests from the federal government that
immigrants be held for up to forty-eight hours after they ordinarily would be
released. 132 Refusing to honor a detainer request makes it more likely that an
immigrant will be released from local custody before federal officials arrive to take
custody of the person. Anti-detainer policies were rare prior to 2013, and they have
since proliferated—a testament to the view that Secure Communities undermines
immigrant trust in local police, as well as to the belief that public actions by local law
enforcement agencies can help rebuild that trust.133
The fact that a local jurisdiction adopted one of these policies may indicate
concern, within the community, that local immigration involvement is especially
likely to impede community cooperation with police in that locality. That prediction
cannot be tested directly, because of the timing of these policies. Sanctuary policies
were mostly adopted before our sample period, and anti-detainer policies mostly
arrived after it, which precludes the possibility of making comparisons within a
county before and after the adoption of such a policy. That is, their timing does not
permit us to develop difference-in-difference estimates of their impact on clearance
rates. Nevertheless, it is possible to test whether counties that had already adopted
sanctuary policies, or that would later adopt anti-detainer policies, had a more
pronounced or differential reaction to Secure Communities than other counties.

131 See Trevor Gardner II, The Case for Immigrant Sanctuary: Federalism, Local Penology, and
the Ideological Challenge to the Homeland Security Model (working paper); Villazor, supra note [], at
[]. Trevor Gardner generously shared with us his data on the adoption of sanctuary city policies.
Those data are used as the measure of sanctuary policies in the Table 3 regressions.
132 See Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers after Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 629 (2013).
133 See Catholic Immigration Legal Network (CLINIC), States and Localities That Limit
Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests (July 2015), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articlesclinic/states-and-localities-limit-compliance-ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014 (listing local anti-detainer
policies by jurisdiction and date of adoption). CLINIC is the source of data on anti-detainer policies
for the Table 3 regressions.
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Table 3. Sensitivity of Estimates to Local Immigration Policies
Explanatory Variable

(2)

(3)

(4)

Persons in ICE Custody x
Local Immigrant Policy

-.0027
(.0021)

-.0008
(.0020)

-.0023
(.0021)

Persons in ICE Custody x
No Local Immigrant Policy

-.0003
(.0016)

-.0015
(.0017)

-.0005
(.0017)

Local Immigrant Policy

Antidetainer

Sanctuary

Either anti-detainer
or sanctuary

Persons in ICE Custody

(1)
-.0013
(.0015)

Notes: OLS regression estimates, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the monthly
clearance rate of FBI index crimes. The table reports regression coefficients for the listed explanatory
variable, with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for control variables are omitted in order to
conserve space. N = 267,010. Number of counties in sample = 2,864.

Table 3 shows the results of interacting the variables for the detention rate
under Secure Communities with dummies for the (eventual) presence of one these
local policies. For comparison purposes, the regression in column (1) repeats the
baseline estimate from Table 2. The remaining columns show estimates in which the
detention variable is split into two, one for counties with the local policy and a
second for other counties. Column (2) shows the interaction for anti-detainer
policies, and column (3) shows it for sanctuary policies. Only about 10% of counties
have adopted either of these two policies, and they are correlated: 55% of counties
with sanctuary policies later adopted anti-detainer policies. Column (4) reports
estimates for counties with either of the two policies. The results do not support the
hypothesis that counties adopting these policies were ones especially likely to suffer a
loss of cooperation as a result of Secure Communities. None of the estimates in
Table 3 are statistically significant and, like the baseline estimate, all are close to zero.
On the whole, a thorough testing of Secure Communities, including an examination
of the intensity of the program’s intervention and a study of locations where its
impact is likely to be greatest, shows that the program had no effect on the overall
rate at which police clear FBI index crimes.
4.   Robustness Checks
To probe the sensitivity of the estimates, Table 4 provides a series of robustness
checks. The baseline regression for these checks is the equation in column (3) of
Specification (A) in Table 2—the equation in which we utilized, as a direct measure
of Secure Communities’ intensity, the number of persons detained by ICE under the
program. We repeat this baseline regression in the column (1) of Table 4 in order to
make it easier to compare the findings in this table to that baseline finding from
Table 2. Each subsequent column of this new table reflects a variation on that
baseline equation, and each column shows the coefficient on the (log of) the
detention rates under Secure Communities or, where noted, a variation of it.
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In modeling the frequency with which police clear crimes, the size of the police
force is likely to be an important factor. For that reason, all of the regressions in
Table 2 include a measure of police employment per capita as a control variable.134
But the data for police employment are missing for several counties in some years.
The missing values cause the observations for those county-months to be dropped
from the sample, which leads the panel to be unbalanced. In column (2) of Table 4,
we test whether our estimates are sensitive to the removal of these observations.
They are not: although the estimate changes sign, it remains both small in absolute
value and statistically insignificant.
Under Secure Communities, ICE apprehended immigrants with widely varying
criminal histories. Nearly one-third of all immigrants apprehended had no criminal
record at all; less than one-third had been convicted of a crime that ICE deemed the
most serious. 135 This raises the possibility that our nearly zero baseline estimate
results from aggregating the effect of detaining immigrants who have severe criminal
histories together with the effect of detaining immigrants who have no criminal
history. This might occur if the biometric identification of Secure Communities
facilitated the arrest of serious offenders, thus increasing the clearance rate for
violent crimes, while at the same time an unfavorable popular perception of the
program reduced public cooperation, thus reducing the clearance rate for less serious
crimes. In this circumstance, detentions of immigrants with criminal histories (and
perhaps particularly those with the most serious convictions) would correlate
positively with the clearance rate, while detentions of immigrants without criminal
histories would correlated negatively with it.

134

See supra note [] (describing the control variables included in all of the models).

135 See Miles & Cox, supra note [], at [] (showing graphically the composition of the detainee pool
under Secure Communities over time). It is important to note that even the crimes ICE deems the
most serious offenses include a fair number of nonviolent offenses and even some misdemeanors. See
id. at [] (describing the way in which ICE defines the criminal history categories that it uses to classify
immigrants).
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Table 4. Testing the Sensitivity of the Clearance Rate Estimates
Explanatory
Variable
Persons in ICE
Custody

(1)

(2)

-.0018
(.0013)

.0022
(.0045)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-.0019
(.0065)

-.0028
(.0019)

Sets of
Fingerprints
Submitted

(7)

.0010
(.0074)
.0016
(.0042)

L1 Persons in
ICE Custody

-.0007
(.0067)

L2/L3 Persons
in ICE
Custody

-.0016
(.0069)

Noncriminal
Persons in ICE
Custody

.0036
(.0071)
Exclude
Police
per
Capita

Custody
Measured
as Flow

(8)
.0053**
(.0024)

.0033
(.0027)

Persons
Deported

Change to
Baseline
Regression
Specification

(6)

-.0062
(.0065)

Custody
Measured
per
Foreignborn

Notes: OLS regression estimates, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the monthly
clearance rate for FBI index crimes. The regressions include the same control variables used in the
regressions in column (2) of Table 2. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard errors in
parentheses. In all columns but column (2), N = 325,462, and the number of counties in sample =
2,985. In column (2), N = 306,244, and the number of counties = 3,113.

To test this possibility, the equation in column (3) decomposes the detainees by
the criminal history classifications assigned to them by ICE. Detainees in category L1
have the most serious criminal histories, those in categories L2 and L3 have less
serious criminal records, and “noncriminal” detainees have no criminal records when
they are taken into custody by ICE under Secure Communities.136 The estimates in
column (3) do not bear out the prediction. All of the estimates are close to zero and
statistically insignificant. Also, their signs are contrary to the prediction. The
coefficients for the criminal categories of L1 and L2/L3 are negative, while that on
noncriminal detainees is positive.
The regression in column (4) replaces the cumulative number of immigrants
taken into federal custody under Secure Communities with the number taken into
custody during that specific month. In effect, it measures the monthly “flow” of
immigrants into custody under the program rather than the “stock.” If the program
136

See id. at [].
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shapes clearance rates principally by changing the probability of ICE apprehension,
then this flow measure would provide a more accurate measure of the risk faced by
immigrants in a particular county in a particular month—and thus potentially be a
superior measure of the policy intervention. Yet this alternative way of measuring the
program’s intensity has no meaningful effect: the coefficient is almost identical to the
baseline estimate. To try yet another alternative measure, column (5) changes the
denominator of the detention rate measure. Instead of a county’s total population, it
measures detentions as ratio of the foreign-born population. This measure may more
accurately reflect the relevant risk of detention because only immigrants are targets
of the Secure Communities program. Again, however, the estimate in column (5)
shows that this does not change the conclusion about the program’s impact.
The regression in column (6) replaces the measure of Secure Communities
detentions with an analogous measure of the rate of fingerprint submissions under
the program. If the program prompted local police to alter their enforcement
practices, such as by engaging in racial profiling of Hispanics, then the relevant
measure of the program’s intervention might be better conceptualized as the rate at
which local police stop or arrest people rather than the rate at which ICE detains
them. The measure in column (6) more closely proxies arrests by local police. The
regression in column (7) employs the cumulative stock of deported immigrants
rather than detained immigrants. This measure would be appropriate if Secure
Communities increased only deportations rather than detentions, but as described
above, it increases both. Column (8) includes all three metrics of the program, the
cumulative submission, detention, and deportation measures. A possible theoretical
justification for including all three measures is that it permits one to disentangle the
effects of shorter- and longer-term incapacitation on immigrants’ perceptions of the
risks created by the program. Yet, such fine theoretical distinctions may not be
possible in practice. ICE detains immigrants before deporting them, making these
measures highly correlated.
None of these specifications suggests a different conclusion about Secure
Communities’ impact. All of the estimates in the last three columns of Table 3 imply
relatively small effects on the clearance rate. Four of the five coefficients of interest
in these regressions are positively signed, including the only one of them that is
statistically significant. On the whole, the results in Table 3 point to the conclusion
that Secure Communities has no impact on clearance rates, a conclusion that appears
robust to different ways of measuring the program’s intervention.
5.   Estimates for Individual Crimes
Table 1 showed that the clearance rates of the individual offenses that comprise
the FBI crime index vary widely, from under 15% to over 50%. These differences
suggest that the processes that lead to an offense’s clearance may differ substantially
by the type of offense—raising the possibility that any impact of Secure
Communities on clearance rates might also vary by offense category. Table 5
explores this possibility by presenting regressions on clearance rates for each type of
offense. For each category of offense, the table shows two regression estimates. The
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odd-numbered columns show the estimated coefficients on an indicator variable for
program activation—that is, the baseline differences-in-differences estimates. The
even numbered columns show the estimates when the detention rate measure is
instead used to measure the program’s intensity.
Table 5. Impact of Secure Communities on Clearance Rates of Specific Crimes
(1)

(2)

Murder

.0180**
(.0092)

.0071**
(.0026)

Rape

-.0034
(.0077)

.0005
(.0025)

Robbery

.0121**
(.0057)

.0019
(.0018)

Aggravated Assault

.0141**
(.0065)

.0040*
(.0022)

Burglary

.0045**
(.0019)

.0004
(.0007)

Larceny

.0027
(.0026)

-.0013
(.0010)

Motor Vehicle Theft

-.0094**
(.0028)

-.0030**
(.0010)

.0043
(.0092)

-.0007
(.0028)

Activated

Persons in ICE custody x
Activated

Violent Crimes

Property Crimes

Other Crimes
Simple Assault

Measure of Secure Communities?

Notes: OLS regression estimates, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The table reports regression coefficients, with
standard errors in parentheses. Each regression coefficient represents a separate regression for which
the dependent variable is the listed crime, and the explanatory variable is the measure of Secure
Communities indicated at the bottom of the column. The regressions include the same control
variables used in the regressions in column (2) of Table 2.

Larceny is the most common of the FBI index crimes, composing for over 60%
the reported offenses in the index in 2012. It is therefore not surprising that the
estimates for larceny in Table 5 are very close to the estimates for the overall index
shown in Table 2. Yet, intriguing patterns emerge in the clearance rates for several of
the less common (but still severe) offenses in the index. Five of the other offenses in
the index show positive coefficients, several of which are statistically significant and
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sizable. For example, the differences-in-differences estimate for murder implies that
Secure Communities raised its clearance rate by 1.8 percentage points.
The only offense category with negative and statistically significant estimates is
motor vehicle theft. Yet, it is not clear that this result provides much support for the
view that Secure Communities has impaired public trust. There are reasons to expect
that Secure Communities should exert less of an influence on the clearance rate of
this offense than on other offense categories. Motor vehicle theft is thought to suffer
from less from under-reporting than other types of offenses because state
registration and insurance requirements give motorists a strong incentive to report
stolen vehicles.137 In addition, many motor vehicle thefts occur through professional
rings, and the sort of evidence that would facilitate the arrest of ring participants is
likely different than the type of evidence garnered from public cooperation.138 Even
if the estimates for motor vehicle theft are interpreted as support for the public
cooperation hypotheses, when set against the broader set of results in Table 2, they
offer very tepid support. The clearance rates of six of the seven index crimes
correlate positively or not at all with Secure Communities.
The results for simple assault are also worth noting. Although it is not part of
the FBI crime index, simple assault is a more common offense than any of the
components of the FBI’s index. It is also likely an offense that depends on
cooperation—often in the form of testimony by the victim herself—to clear through
arrest.139 Simple assault thus provides perhaps the best way to capture the concern
that Secure Communities will suppress victim participation in cases involving
domestic violence or other forms of violence among intimates, where victims may
often be concerned not only about their own immigration consequences, but also
about the immigration consequences for the perpetrator. Here again, estimates for
simple assault are close to zero, inconsistently signed, and not statistically significant.
B.   The Effect on Rates of Reported Crime
In addition to making it easier for the police to solve crimes (or perhaps in part
because of this fact), higher levels of cooperation with the police are also often
thought to reduce crime rates.140 Thus, crime rates could be interpreted as a second
measure of community cooperation. If the level of immigrant cooperation with the
137 See Callie M. Rennison, Criminal Victimization 2000: Changes 1999-2000 with Trends 1993-2000,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2001).

See Christopher T. McDonald, The Changing Face of Vehicle Theft, 78 POLICE CHIEF (2011); Ian
Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical
Analysis of LoJack, 113 Q. J. ECON. 43, 60-61 (1998).
138

139 See, e.g., Barbara E. Smith, Evaluation of Efforts to Implement No-Drop Policies: Two
Central Values in Conflict, Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (March 2001),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/
Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=187772.
140 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study of collective
efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997).
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police declined in the wake of Secure Communities’ rollout, therefore, one might
predict that crime rates would rise. In fact, this claim has been made explicitly by
many opponents of the program, who have argued that Secure Communities will
increase local crime and decrease community safety.141
In related work, we have explored the relationship between Secure Communities
and crime rates. Our analysis in Does Immigration Enforcement Effect Crime? found no
evidence that Secure Communities reduced the overall rate of FBI index crimes.142
Crime rates did indeed fall around the nation during the period of Secure
Communities’ rollout, and they fell especially fast in counties with larger shares of
foreign-born persons. But after controlling for these trends, our analysis detected no
impact of the program on aggregate rates of crime.143 The failure to find an impact
on crime rates reinforces the interpretation that the program was, in the main, an
immigration enforcement effort.144
To make it easier to compare these crime rate findings to the clearance rate
findings above, Table 6 (contained in the Appendix) presents a set of estimates for
crime rates that parallel those for clearance rates in Table 2. These results confirm
the findings in our earlier article. The most prominent feature of the estimates in
Table 5 is the importance of controlling for county-level trends. In the absence of
these trends, the various measures of the program correlate with declines in crime
rates, and in some instances, substantial declines. But when the regression removes
the trend of crime within each county, the point estimates uniformly fall to zero or
close to it. None of them remain statistically significant above the .05 level. This
pattern is consistent both in the baseline specification in Regression A and in the
four alternatives that consider counties with proportionately high foreign-born and
Hispanic populations, counties on the southern border, and counties by year of
activation. The results in Table 6 confirm that Secure Communities had no
meaningful effect on crime rates.
The lack of evidence that Secure Communities had any impact on crime rates is
important for three reasons. First, it is consistent with our clearance rate finding in
141

See supra text accompanying notes []-[].

See Miles & Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime?, supra note 8, at []. Relying on our
findings, the New York Times argued for the abolition of Secure Communities. See Editorial Board,
The “Secure Communities” Illusion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/
06/opinion/the-secure-communities-illusion.html. On November 20, 2014, the Secretary of
Homeland Secure Jeh Johnson announced publicly that “The Secure Communities program, as we
know it, will be discontinued.” Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Department of Homeland
Security, Nov. 20, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
secure_communities.pdf. Nonetheless, the core aspect of the program—mandatory immigration
screening for all local arrestees—continues under the new label of the “Priority Enforcement
Program.” See id.
142
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See id.

See Cox and Miles, supra note [] (exploiting the program’s rollout timing to test competing
hypotheses: first, that the program was thought of an implemented as a crime control strategy;
second, that it was designed as an immigration control measure).
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rejecting the prediction of the cooperation theories that we laid out in Part I. 145
Moreover, while evaluations of public programs often consider only one outcome,
which simplifies drawing normative conclusions, an evaluation that considers two
outcomes permits us to make more complex normative judgments about the value of
a program like Secure Communities. For example, if clearance rates remained
unchanged while crime rates fell, it would suggest that the program succeeded at
reducing the frequency of offending while not reducing the rate at which police
“solved” crimes. This would suggest that the program succeeded along both
dimensions. But the results in Table 6 demonstrate that this possibility can be
excluded.
Second, our finding that the program did not reduce crime rates ameliorates the
concern that Secure Communities might have affected clearance rates through an
alternative causal pathway to the one we focus on in this Article. Had Secure
Communities affected the crime rate, that change itself could have altered clearance
rates. The reason is that clearance rates are defined as the number of offenses solved
divided by the total number of offenses. The denominator of this fraction measures
crimes, and changes in the number of offenses will mechanically change the
clearance rate unless there is also a change in the number of offenses solved by the
police. Now, of course, if there are more crimes there will be more opportunities to
solve crimes, so there is no deterministic relationship between crimes rates and
clearance rates. But it is easy to see why changes in the former might affect the latter.
If crime rates declined significantly as a result of Secure Communities, for example,
clearance rates might have gone up simply because the police were able to devote
their resources to solving a smaller number of crimes—increasing their success rate.
Thus, the fact that we find no change in crime rates gives us greater confidence in
the robustness of our clearance rate finding.
Third, the crime rate finding alleviates concerns one might have about the fact
that the FBI’s UCR data, like almost all crime data, cannot measure the actual number
of criminal offenses and so is restricted to measuring the reported number.146 The fact
that we measure reported offenses suggests that there are actually two competing
predictions one might have about the effect of community cooperation on crime
rates. On the one hand, crime rates might go up as cooperation goes down. On the
other hand, reported crime rates might actually go down if immigrant community
members lose trust in the police and shy away from reporting crimes.147 If Secure
Communities caused more crimes to go unreported, the clearance rate might
artificially rise, as the police would be able to devote their resources to solving a
145

See supra text accompanying notes []-[] (discussing limitations with clearance rates).

See FBI, Uniform Crime Report: Offenses Cleared (2013), http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-lawenforcement/clearances/clearancetopic_final.pdf.
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Given the structure of Secure Communities, which functions as a point-of-arrest immigration
screen, this might be particular true in situations where a person’s report will result in the arrest of a
friend or loved one.
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fewer number of reported offenses.148 But we found no decline in reported crime
rates. This is possible under the under-reporting theory only if Secure Communities
led to a rise in actual crime rates that was somehow magically offset by an equal
decline in reporting. This possibility seems farfetched.
C.  Implications
In short, we find no evidence that Secure Communities caused a reduction in
the rate at which FBI index crimes are cleared. Our evaluation of individual crimes
points to the same overall conclusion. While there is suggestive evidence that Secure
Communities may have caused a small decrease in the clearance rate of one property
offense (motor vehicle theft), seven of the eight individual crimes we examined have
clearance rates that correlate either positively or not at all with Secure Communities.
In fact, if the estimates for individual crimes were taken at face value, they imply that
the program actually increased the rate at which murder and aggravated assault are
cleared. In our judgment those individual estimates should be taken with a grain of
salt. Nonetheless, they reinforce the overall pattern of our empirical analysis, in
which basically every estimate of the program’s effect is both close to zero and so
precisely estimated that we would be able to detect very small movements in
clearance rates. Combining that clearance rate finding with the lack of evidence that
the program had any effect of reported crime rates provides strong evidence
supporting the conclusion that Secure Communities did not reduce community
cooperation with the police.
To consider the implications of this finding, recall the causal structure of
procedural justice theory:

Law Enforcement
Policy

Perceived Legitmacy
of Law Enforcement

Cooperation

Given this two-step structure, there are two principal ways our finding might be
interpreted, each of which has significant implications for theories about legitimacy
and cooperation. The first possibility is that the perceived legitimacy of law
enforcement does not significantly affect levels of community cooperation with the
police. Perhaps people decide whether to cooperate largely for other reasons—such
as self-interest, or a sense of personal morality. This conclusion would call into
question a long line of procedural justice scholarship, which has argued on the basis
of surveys and lab experiments that the perception of legitimacy is the most powerful

148 To be sure, it could also drive down clearance rates if the crimes that were no longer reported
were ones that previously had been the most likely to be solved.
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predictor of cooperative behavior.149 Shifting the focus from surveyed beliefs to realworld behavior yields a starkly different conclusion about whether policies designed
to promote procedural justice will reap immediate crime-fighting dividends.
That does not mean, of course, that we should necessarily reject reform efforts
designed to enhance procedural justice. The discrete policies often discussed in the
procedural justice literature—policies aimed at enhancing the procedural regularity of
the criminal justice system, reducing the unequal treatment of marginalized
communities, and so on—have much else to recommend them. Our findings simply
suggest that these policies might be better defended on more traditional grounds of
due process and equal protection than on the ground that they are critical to law
enforcement success. 150 Moreover, our findings are focused on seven relatively
serious crimes. Serious crime is, of course, an important domain, but that does not
diminish the goal of determining whether our findings hold in other contexts—such
as with respect to minor, “quality of life” offenses that are the focus of some
procedural justice studies.151 For this reason, it would be valuable to complement
existing procedural justice scholarship with more studies measuring real-world
behavior rather than just surveyed beliefs, building on this Article’s first step in that
effort.
The second possible interpretation of our findings is that Secure Communities
did not lead immigrants to lose trust in local police or to see them as less legitimate.
(In other words, perhaps the first stage of the causal process was not satisfied.) As
we explained in Part II, procedural justice theory predicts that an intervention like
Secure Communities should de-legitimate local police—by causing immigrants to
doubt the fairness of police procedures, the equality of their treatment in police
encounters, and the trustworthiness of police motives. 152 This implication of the
theory has been advanced by leading procedural justice scholars. Moreover, the belief
that Secure Communities would have these effects has been far from limited to
academics; it also became the leading critique of Secure Communities lodged by
public officials, policy organizations, and community activists. Fear of the program’s
de-legitimating effects may even have helped precipitate the program’s ultimate
demise.
If this widely-held belief was mistaken, and Secure Communities had no effect
on police legitimacy, that conclusion would cast doubt on the legitimacy-based
149
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In this sense, our findings suggest some skepticism about the happy story told by much
procedural justice scholarship. In that story, reforms that enhance participation, process, and equality
in policing represent win-win policies—protecting the rights of community members while
simultaneously promoting the public safety goals of law enforcement officials. While this account has
considerable political appeal, in reality it may not often be the case that we can have our cake and eat
it too.
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arguments frequently advanced against cooperative immigration enforcement. 153
More importantly, if procedural justice theory predicts these de-legitimating effects,
but if in fact they did not occur, then we would have to ask: Where did the theory go
wrong? 154 First, perhaps critics of Secure Communities were working with an
excessively optimistic account of how immigrant-police relationships operate in the
absence of local involvement in federal immigration enforcement. A longstanding
finding in the procedural justice literature is that the communities most likely to have
large numbers of immigrants—urban centers with large minority populations, higher
rates of poverty, and so on—are places where there is already a considerable lack of
trust in the police.155 If baseline levels of trust are already low, a new program like
Secure Communities may not reduce them further.156 Relatedly, if immigrants (like
many citizens) view different “law enforcement” entities as a single undifferentiated
mass—seeing local cops, federal investigative services like the FBI and DEA, and
immigration enforcement arms like CBP and ICE as all of a piece—then changes in
the extent of cooperation between these entities will actually have little effect on
public attitudes.
More theoretically, perhaps procedural justice theory is overly optimistic about
the ability of discrete policy interventions to significantly change public attitudes
about the police. The theory argues that actual police practices shape a person’s
perceptions about whether those practices are procedurally just, and those
perceptions in turn alter a person’s beliefs about the legitimacy of the police. But
causation may often run in the opposite direction: a person’s beliefs about whether
the police are legitimate may instead shape her perceptions about how she is treated
by the police.157 To put it slightly differently, a person’s beliefs about the police may
153

See supra sources cited in notes []-[].

From time to time, there is a suggestion in procedural justice scholarship that only direct
empirical evidence about the beliefs of individuals can tell us anything about the procedural justice
implications of particular policies. On such a view, our question might seem misplaced: the theory did
not go astray, one might argue, because the theory simply does not tell us anything definite until we go
out and measure beliefs. Of course, the implication of this view is that procedural justice theory
provides no testable predictions about the way in which government policies shape public beliefs
about government institutions.
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155 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural) Tolerance
of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 777(1998); Tyler &
Fagan, supra note []. That said, there is some evidence that immigrant communities have less cynicism
than similarly situated native communities, see Kirk et al., supra note [] at 92, and that “residents of
immigrant neighborhoods are actually more cooperative with the police than are residents of nativeborn neighborhoods.” Id. at 93. While this evidence is limited—based on correlations in survey
responses—it suggests that it is at least not obvious that immigrants, in general, start from a place of
deep distrust of local law enforcement.
156 This conclusion would have implications far beyond Secure Communities, because many
police policies criticized on procedural justice grounds are policies that impact communities that
already harbor low levels of trust in law enforcement.
157 See David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 29, 32–33 (Tom Tyler et al. eds. 2007) (exploring this possibility).
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often be far too sticky to be affected significantly by any individual policy reform—
even a reform as far-reaching and widely publicized as Secure Communities. Again,
this does not necessarily mean that constructing just institutions is beside the point.
One hopes that, over the long run, well-designed public policies can promote the
legitimacy of law enforcement and promote cooperation with the police. But to the
extent perceptions of legitimacy are the product of long-term social processes, it is a
mistake to believe that discrete procedural justice interventions will significantly alter
the beliefs of community members over the short run.
Before concluding, we turn to one final way in which one might attempt to
interpret our core finding. In theory, it is possible that Secure Communities both delegitimated local police and undermined voluntary immigrant cooperation, but did so
without affecting the rate at the police were able to solve crimes. This could have
occurred if it turned out that the voluntary cooperation contemplated by procedural
justice scholars—calling the police, providing leads, and so forth—was simply not all
that important for crime-solving. Maybe other investigative techniques, including the
less-than-fully-voluntary “cooperation” often obtained from co-conspirators or
others involved in a criminal enterprise, are much more important in most criminal
contexts. If involuntary cooperation is a much more significant crime-fighting tool
than is acknowledged by the procedural justice literature, then many criminal justice
interventions that implicate legitimacy could in theory be double-edged swords from
the perspective of cooperation—increasing involuntary cooperation even as they
undercut the more voluntary sort. One might even tell such a story about Secure
Communities: perhaps the program increased rates of involuntary cooperation by
providing local police with an additional threat threat they could use to coerce
assistance from otherwise uncooperative immigrants.
Ultimately, we are somewhat skeptical of this final possibility. But the larger
point is this: Every possible interpretation of our core finding has significant
implications for how we think about the connection between legitimacy and
cooperation, as well as for how we evaluate the role of procedural justice theory in
mediating that relationship.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question why people cooperate with the police is as important as it is old.
Recently, answering the question for one group of people—immigrants—has
become all the more pressing. Many are worried that immigrant cooperation with the
police is threatened by the growing role local police play in the enforcement of
federal immigration law. Procedural justice scholars, policymakers, and advocates all
argue that this role for local law enforcement threatens to undermine the
trustworthiness and legitimacy of local police in the eyes of immigrants. The loss of
legitimacy, they contend, will curtail immigrant cooperation and threaten public
safety.
This Article capitalizes on the natural experiment provided by Secure
Communities—the largest integration of local police into federal immigration
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enforcement in the nation’s history—to test empirically whether de-legitimating
police policies actually undermine cooperation with law enforcement. We find no
evidence that the activation of Secure Communities reduced cooperative behavior by
immigrants. This finding has important implications for how we evaluate increasingly
widespread policies of cooperative immigration federalism. It also raises critical
questions about the power of procedural justice theory to predict the real-world
consequences of police policy interventions.
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APPENDIX
Table 6. Impact of Secure Communities on Crime Rate of FBI Index Crimes
Explanatory Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-.0400**
(.0173)

.0025
(.0118)

-.0163**
(.0051)

-.0006
(.0045)

Activated x 75th Percentile
of Fraction Pop. Foreign
Born

-.0545**
(.0191)

-.0024
(.0144)

-.0165**
(.0052)

-.0006
(.0048)

Activated x Below 75th
Percentile of Fraction Pop.
Foreign Born

.0067
(.0154)

.0120
(.0095)

-.0067
(.0063)

-.0007
(.0045)

Activated x 75th Percentile
of Fraction Pop. Hispanic

-.0522**
(.0212)

.0067
(.0166)

-.0052**
(.0212)

.0014
(.0051)

Activated x Below 75th
Percentile of Fraction Pop.
Hispanic

-.0152
(.0139)

-.0027
(.0088)

-.0152
(.0139)

-.0080*
(.0042)

Activated x Border County

-.1887**
(.0282)

-.0067
(.0569)

.0410**
(.0042)

-.0013
(.0112)

Activated x Not Border
County

-.0312
(.0170)

.0028
(.0114)

-.0134**
(.0054)

-.0006
(.0047)

Activated x First Year

-.0778**
(.0291)

.0088
(.0313)

-.0213**
(.0063)

-.0016
(.0067)

Activated x Second Year

-.0331*
(.0190)

-.0097
(.0121)

-.0109**
(.0053)

-.0011
(.0050)

Activated x Third Year

-.0021
(.0144)

.0053
(.0104)

-.0060
(.0048)

.0019
(.0045)

Activated x Fourth Year

-.0031
(.0144)

.0040
(.0129)

-.0197
(.0067)

-.0007
(.0060)

Activated

Activated

Persons in ICE
Custody x
Activated

Persons in ICE
Custody x
Activated

N

Y

N

Y

Regression Specification A
Activated
Regression Specification B

Regression Specification C

Regression Specification D

Regression Specification E

Measure of Secure
Communities?
Includes County-level Trends?

Notes: OLS regression estimates, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the rate of
clearance of the monthly index crimes. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard errors
in parentheses. N = 292,551. Number of counties in sample = 2,985.
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